



IYC 2026
Group of Fourteen
Study Guide

Points of Contact

COMMITTEE-SPECIFIC CONTACTS FOR GROUP OF FOURTEEN

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FORMAL AGENDA

Blood at the Border: Terrorism, Refugees, and the Durand Line Dispute

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HOW TO USE THIS GUIDE

Read Sections 3-8 for the facts, Section 10 for your country line, Sections 12-15 for law and solutions, and Sections 16-18 just before committee.

How to use this guide

1

THE 20-MINUTE BRIEF

Sections 3, 7, 8, 10 and 16. Get the crisis picture, your country line and the questions your draft must answer.

2

THE NEGOTIATOR ROUTE

Sections 11, 13, 14, 15 and 18. Build coalitions, test legal claims and turn them into clauses.

3

THE CRISIS ROUTE

Sections 6, 7, 12 and 17. Understand armed spoilers and react to a newsflash without escalating on guesswork.

4

THE RESEARCH ROUTE

Sections 5, 9, 19 and 20. Build the historical record, use terms precisely and follow primary sources.

Five rules for factual discipline

1

1 - Attribute claims.

Say “Pakistan alleges” and “the Taliban authorities deny” when the facts are disputed.

2

2 - Prefer verified civilian figures.

Use UNAMA where available; do not repeat incompatible battlefield claims as fact.

3

3 - Keep legal categories separate.

Refugee, asylum-seeker, PoR holder, ACC holder, visa holder, returnee and deportee do not mean the same thing.

4

4 - Separate advocacy from judgment.

A call for a war-crime investigation is not a court conviction.

5

5 - Respect the freeze date.

Use only information available by 22 July 2026.

A USEFUL DELEGATE SOUNDS PRECISE

State who verified a number, when it was verified, what is still disputed, and what mechanism should follow.

01. Letter from the Dais

Dear Delegates,

A border can be ink on a map. Here, it is also a battlefield, a market, an escape route, and a wound carried across generations.

Pakistan says armed groups based in Afghanistan are killing its citizens and security personnel. Afghanistan's de facto authorities deny supporting those attacks and accuse Pakistan of violating sovereignty through strikes and shelling. Civilians on both sides are paying for claims they did not make. Afghan families in Pakistan also face arrest, return or deportation into a country already strained by poverty, rights restrictions and conflict.

The easy questions are not the real questions. Terrorism exists. States do have a right of self-defence. The difficult questions are these: Who carried out an attack? Was force necessary? Was it proportionate? Were civilians protected? At what point does a security policy create more insecurity than it removes?

The Durand Line makes every answer harder. Pakistan treats it as the inherited international boundary. Afghan governments have historically refused formal recognition, arguing that a colonial line divided Pashtun and Baloch communities. The dispute is legal, historical and deeply emotional. Armed groups exploit all three layers.

This committee will reward precision. Do not turn allegations into facts. Do not call every Afghan in Pakistan a refugee. Do not treat counter-terrorism as a blank cheque. Do not treat sovereignty as permission to ignore armed groups operating from national territory. Most importantly, do not write a humane-sounding resolution that nobody can verify.

Your task is to build a deal in which Pakistan becomes safer without making Afghan civilians bargaining chips; Afghanistan keeps its sovereignty without serving as a permissive base for attacks; people at risk receive protection; and the frontier can be managed even before its final political status is settled.

The frontier has absorbed promises for more than a century.

Bring mechanisms.

The G14 Dais

02. Committee Overview - The G14

SIMULATION NOTE

G14 is a conference-defined emergency diplomatic forum, not a real treaty body. Your conference rules and mandate override this guide.

2.1 Why the G14 exists

The crisis sits between two states, but the solution cannot. Terror finance crosses borders. Refugee protection depends on donors and host communities. Border trade links South Asia to Central Asia. Mediation runs through Beijing, Doha, Ankara and Riyadh. Sanctions and recognition involve the United Nations and major powers.

The G14 is therefore a compact high-level forum: small enough to negotiate, broad enough to include the two parties, mediators, neighbours, donors and major powers.

2.2 What the committee can produce

Political package

A joint communique, public commitments and clear red lines.

Ceasefire rules

Hotlines, notification rules, protected zones and third-party verification.

Counter-terror compact

Evidence exchange, finance controls, sanctions and monitored action against named entities.

Protection framework

Screening, exemptions, lawful stay, voluntary return, aid and reintegration.

Border management

Safer crossings and fence-dispute rules without settling the final status of the line.

External requests

Recommendations to UN bodies, donors and financial institutions.

2.3 What it cannot honestly do

A G14 paper cannot redraw a boundary, deploy UN peacekeepers, waive Security Council sanctions, force extradition or make an unsigned treaty binding. It can create consent-based monitoring, pledge plausible national resources and request action from the proper institutions. Anything beyond that is theatre, not diplomacy.

2.4 The four-part decision test

- 1 **LEGAL**
Is it within the forum's authority?
- 2 **VERIFIABLE**
Who checks compliance, and how?
- 3 **FUNDED**
Who pays, and when?
- 4 **REVERSIBLE**
What happens after a breach?

03. The Crisis in One View

Three crises are feeding one another. Solve only one, and the other two can undo it.

Axis I - Cross-border militancy

TTP is not the Afghan Taliban, but the groups have ideological, historical and personal links. Pakistan alleges that TTP leaders and fighters use Afghan territory for attacks. The Taliban authorities deny supporting attacks on Pakistan. A February 2026 UN monitoring report said Afghanistan remained permissive for several terrorist groups and that TTP had gained greater freedom, while the de facto authorities continued operations against ISIL-K. [6]

Axis II - State-to-state force

By early 2026, the crisis had moved beyond isolated border incidents. Pakistani airstrikes and Afghan retaliation produced sustained fighting. UNAMA recorded 372 civilians killed and 397 injured in Afghanistan from 1 January to 31 March 2026 because of cross-border violence. [8] The 16 March strike in Kabul is under special scrutiny: UNAMA recorded at least 269 civilians killed and 122 injured; Amnesty later called for an investigation into a possible war crime, while Pakistan said it struck military and terrorist infrastructure. [12]

Axis III - Forced movement

Pakistan has hosted Afghans for more than four decades, but removals expanded under the Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan. IOM recorded 1,125,946 returns from Pakistan in 2025, up from 315,100 in 2024. **[13]** These figures include different kinds of movement - they are not all voluntary and they are not all deportations. By 4 July 2026, UNHCR reporting indicated about 923,600 returns to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan during 2026. **[15]**

04. Anatomy of the Frontier

4.1 A 2,600-kilometre system

The frontier runs from the high Wakhan region near China to the Iranian border. Mountains, dry riverbeds, divided settlements and old tribal routes make total physical control impossible. Pakistan's fencing since 2017 has changed movement, but it has not erased family, commercial and political networks older than either state.

4.2 Three strategic crossings

Torkham carries trade, travellers and returnees. Ghulam Khan sits near areas central to militant movement. Spin Boldak-Chaman is a major trade and population corridor. When one crossing closes, pressure shifts to the others.

4.3 Why closure can backfire

Closure can disrupt movement for a time. It also blocks legal trade, separates families, raises prices, increases smuggling profits and crowds desperate travellers into fewer points. A closure without humanitarian lanes and a clear reopening rule may strengthen the informal networks it was meant to weaken.

4.4 Why the fence is political

For Pakistan, the fence marks a settled boundary and reduces infiltration. For many Afghans, it gives physical form to a line they never accepted. A dispute over one post can therefore become a sovereignty crisis within hours.

05. How the Line Became a Conflict

THE BORDER DID NOT BECOME A CRISIS IN 2026.

1893	Durand Agreement divides spheres of influence.
1919-21	Post-war treaties revisit and affirm frontier arrangements.
1947	Pakistan inherits the frontier; Kabul contests it.
1979-89	War turns the frontier into a supply and sanctuary zone.
2007	TTP forms as an umbrella insurgent movement.
2017	Pakistan accelerates fencing and fortification.
2021	The Taliban return to power in Kabul.

2023-25 Pakistan expands removals of Afghan nationals.

2025 Doha ceasefire follows major border fighting.

2026 Open hostilities, mass displacement and Urumqi talks.

5.1 The 1893 agreement

On 12 November 1893, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan and British Indian official Mortimer Durand signed a short agreement setting their spheres of influence. The line split Pashtun and Baloch communities and reflected imperial strategy, not a modern vote of the people. The text contains no 100-year expiry clause. [2]

5.2 Pakistan's succession claim

British and Afghan authorities returned to the frontier in later agreements. Pakistan argues that independence in 1947 did not erase an existing boundary: it inherited British India's frontier under rules that protect stable borders. Afghan governments have rejected formal recognition, pointing to colonial pressure, divided communities and the lack of Afghan consent to Pakistan's claim.

5.3 What practice settles - and what it does not

International maps and diplomacy generally treat the line as the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. That is strong evidence of practice. It does not erase the political dispute, and no international court has issued a final judgment focused specifically on the Durand Line. Delegates must separate legal argument, international practice and domestic legitimacy.

5.4 A frontier shaped by war

The anti-Soviet war, civil war, Taliban rule, the post-2001 intervention and Pakistani operations in the former tribal areas repeatedly turned the frontier into a corridor for fighters, weapons, refugees and intelligence services. The border dispute did not create every militant group, but weak and contested governance gave armed actors room to survive.

06. The Militant Landscape

6.1 Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Formed in 2007 as an umbrella of Pakistani militant factions, TTP seeks to coerce or overthrow the Pakistani state and impose its interpretation of Islamic rule. It is listed under the UN ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions regime. Its targets have included security forces, police, political actors and civilians. [5]

The central dispute is attribution. Pakistan alleges sanctuary, logistics and freedom of movement in Afghanistan. The Taliban authorities deny that Afghan soil is used for attacks and call TTP violence Pakistan's internal problem. The 2026 UN Monitoring Team did not accept Kabul's claim that no terrorist groups were present. [6]

6.2 Afghan Taliban

The Taliban govern Afghanistan de facto and were formally recognized by Russia in July 2025, the first state to do so. [24] They are not the same organization as TTP. They have fought ISIL-K, but UN monitors continue to report links between Taliban figures and Al-Qaida-linked networks, as well as permissive conditions for TTP. Engagement with Kabul is unavoidable; treating every Taliban institution as one terrorist unit is analytically useless.

6.3 ISIL-K

ISIL-K is hostile to the Taliban, Pakistan and foreign interests. It has attacked civilians, religious minorities and diplomatic targets. Any deal must account for it: pressure on TTP may create defectors or openings for ISIL-K, while indiscriminate force can feed ISIL-K propaganda.

6.4 Al-Qaida and AQIS

Al-Qaida's core presence in Afghanistan is assessed as small, but small does not mean harmless. Its value lies in expertise, networks and training. The 2026 Monitoring Team described Al-Qaida as a service provider and force multiplier, especially for TTP, and reported AQIS activity in south-eastern Afghanistan. [6]

6.5 Use an evidence ladder

Preventive diplomacy cannot wait for a criminal conviction, but it also cannot rest on public accusation alone. A workable system can use three levels:

- 1 **LEVEL 1 - LEAD**
Confidential intelligence shared for checking.
- 2 **LEVEL 2 - FILE**
Incident jointly verified by trained liaison teams.
- 3 **LEVEL 3 - FINDING**
Redacted public result from a neutral technical cell.

The higher the consequence, the higher the evidence standard. Extradition or force demands more proof than opening an investigation.

6.6 Technology changes the frontier

Commercial satellite links, encrypted messaging, cheap drones, online fundraising and AI-assisted propaganda reduce the value of fencing alone. The 2026 Monitoring Team warned that terrorist groups were using commercial satellite communications and becoming more capable with artificial intelligence. [6] A real counter-terror package must cover finance, communications, cyber investigation and evidence preservation - not only patrols and airstrikes.

6.7 The fragmentation trap

Pressure on one group can strengthen another. TTP factions may split rather than comply. ISIL-K may recruit defectors who see the Taliban as too compromising. Al-Qaida-linked facilitators can sell expertise across networks. A demobilization plan therefore needs registration, weapons control, monitored livelihoods and consequences for remobilization. It must not punish families or whole communities.

ANALYTICAL RULE

Shared ideology does not prove shared command. Sanctuary does not automatically prove state attribution. Two groups hating each other does not make either one a partner. Draft separate duties for each actor.

07. From Proxy Claims to Open Fighting

7.1 The post-2021 rupture

Pakistan expected the Taliban's return to Kabul to reduce Indian influence and improve security coordination. Instead, TTP attacks rose, fence disputes continued, and Pakistan-TTP talks failed. Whether the Taliban were unwilling or unable to dismantle TTP became the central bilateral grievance.

7.2 Airstrikes and retaliation

Pakistani strikes inside Afghanistan in 2024 and 2025 deepened the sovereignty dispute. In October 2025, the two states entered their deadliest clashes since 2021 before Qatar and Türkiye brokered an immediate ceasefire in Doha. Later talks struggled to create a system that could enforce it. [25]

7.3 February-March 2026

The ceasefire broke under the pressure of more militant attacks and cross-border strikes. By late February, Pakistani and Afghan forces were exchanging fire across several sectors, and Pakistani strikes reached targets in and around major Afghan cities. Both sides released large, conflicting military casualty claims. This guide does not treat them as verified.

372

civilians killed in Afghanistan, Jan-Mar 2026 [8]

397

civilians injured in the same UNAMA paper [8]

100,000+

people reported displaced by early March [11]

UNAMA linked the civilian toll to airstrikes, shelling and fighting. The ICRC called on all parties to protect civilians, the wounded, hospitals and access to basic services. [10]

7.4 The 16 March Kabul strike

UNAMA recorded at least 269 civilians killed and 122 injured. Afghan authorities and UNAMA said a drug rehabilitation centre was hit. Pakistan said it targeted military and terrorist infrastructure. On 22 July, Amnesty said its review of imagery, video and interviews found no evidence supporting Pakistan's account at the site and called for an investigation into a possible war crime. [12] That is a serious allegation, not a final court ruling.

7.5 Urumqi opens a channel

From 1 to 7 April 2026, China hosted Afghan and Pakistani delegations for informal talks in Urumqi. Beijing identified terrorism as the core issue and stressed dialogue. [23] The channel matters because China has leverage with both parties. It still needs monitoring, humanitarian input and support from other mediators.

CRISIS WARNING

One mass-casualty attack, one strike on a protected site or one disputed fence post can collapse talks. Build automatic de-escalation rules before the next incident.

o8. Refugees, Returnees and Collective Punishment

8.1 Who is being discussed?

Afghans in Pakistan do not form one legal category. Some hold Proof of Registration cards. Some hold Afghan Citizen Cards. Others are undocumented, hold visas, seek asylum, were born in Pakistan or have special protection claims linked to work, gender, ethnicity, politics or foreign missions. A mass policy that ignores these differences will miss people at real risk.

8.2 Pakistan's capacity argument

Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghans for four decades, often with limited international cost-sharing. It points to pressure on housing, services, jobs, policing and security screening, and argues that no state must accept indefinite irregular residence. Those concerns are real. They do not remove the need for individual screening or allow return to torture, persecution or other serious harm.

8.3 The return surge

Pakistan launched the Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan in 2023 and expanded it in stages. UNHCR and IOM distinguish voluntary repatriation, other returns and deportations. Fear of arrest, eviction, lost work or lost documents can make a formally voluntary departure coercive in practice. IOM's 2025 total was more than three times the 2024 figure. [13]

8.4 Who faces higher risk?

Risk is individual. It may be higher for former officials, journalists, human-rights defenders, religious minorities, women in public life, people linked to foreign missions and people facing family or political retaliation. Restrictions on women and girls, weak services and humanitarian shortfalls increase the danger. UN experts and UNHCR have repeatedly urged exemptions for people with international protection needs. [16][17]

8.5 The security fallacy

Nationality is not evidence of militancy. Security screening should focus on identity, conduct and evidence. Sudden mass removals can overwhelm Afghan border provinces, strengthen smugglers, cut intelligence sources off from authorities and create recruitment opportunities for armed groups.

8.6 A lawful return workflow

- 1 **1 - REGISTER**
Record identity, family links and documents. Do not arrest people at registration points.
- 2 **2 - SCREEN**
Run individual security checks and a confidential protection interview with UNHCR access.
- 3 **3 - DECIDE**
Give written reasons: lawful stay, voluntary return, third-country route or removal with appeal.

4

4 - PREPARE

Settle wages and property, preserve medical care and school records, and keep families together.

5

5 - MONITOR

Track reception, cash support, protection and reintegration for at least 12 months.

MINIMUM PROTECTION FLOOR

No round-ups at schools, hospitals or UN sites; no family separation; access to UNHCR and counsel; screening for non-return risk; medical and child exemptions; notice and appeal; supported voluntary return; monitored reintegration; and international cost-sharing.

8.7 The core policy choice

The committee does not have to choose between “no returns ever” and “remove everyone now.” It can phase enforcement, protect high-risk groups, expand legal stay, fund host districts, open third-country pathways and support genuinely voluntary return.

09. Key Terms and Definitions

Durand Line

The frontier drawn from the 1893 Anglo-Afghan agreement and later arrangements. Pakistan and most international practice treat it as the state border; successive Afghan governments have not formally recognized it.

De facto authorities

The Taliban institutions that exercise governmental control in Afghanistan. The term does not assume formal recognition.

TTP

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, a Pakistani militant umbrella formed in 2007. It is distinct from, but historically and ideologically linked to, the Afghan Taliban.

ISIL-K / ISIS-K

The Khorasan branch of Islamic State. It is hostile to the Taliban and has carried out mass-casualty attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

AQIS

Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, an Al-Qaida affiliate active in parts of South Asia.

Non-refoulement

The rule against returning a person to a place where they face specified serious harm. The ban on return to torture appears in Article 3 of the Convention against Torture. [\[19\]](#)

PoR card

Proof of Registration documentation used for registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

ACC

Afghan Citizen Card, a Pakistani documentation category separate from PoR registration.

Voluntary repatriation

Return based on a free and informed choice, normally with safeguards and assistance. A departure caused by serious pressure may not be truly voluntary.

Deportation

Formal removal by state authority. It is different from spontaneous return or assisted voluntary repatriation.

Uti possidetis juris

A principle that favours keeping inherited administrative borders at independence.

Without prejudice

A clause stating that practical cooperation does not decide or concede the underlying legal claim.

Hot pursuit

A narrow concept in maritime law. It is not a general licence to chase a non-state actor into another country.

“Unwilling or unable” doctrine

A contested theory used by some states to justify self-defence against non-state actors in another state when that state will not or cannot address the threat.

International armed conflict

An armed conflict between states. It can exist without a formal declaration of war.

Distinction

The duty to distinguish civilians and civilian objects from combatants and military objectives. [20]

Proportionality in attack

The ban on attacks expected to cause civilian harm excessive compared with the concrete and direct military advantage expected. [21]

Precautions

The duty to take all feasible steps to avoid or reduce civilian harm. [22]

10. Country Matrix - 20 Relevant States

This is a starting point, not a substitute for country research. “Likely posture” is an inference from public policy, geography and alliances as of the freeze date.

Afghanistan

CORE INTERESTS: Sovereignty; regime survival; trade; refugee reintegration; legitimacy.

LIKELY POSTURE: Condemn Pakistani strikes and forced returns; deny state support for TTP; resist formal recognition of the Durand Line.

LEVERAGE: Control of territory and crossings; influence over armed networks; access to Central Asia.

RED LINE: No foreign strikes; no coerced recognition; no public humiliation of Taliban leaders.

DEAL SPACE: Monitored anti-TTP plan paired with ceasefire, aid and a without-prejudice border clause.

Pakistan

CORE INTERESTS: End TTP attacks; secure western frontier; boundary recognition; manage Afghan population and domestic pressure.

LIKELY POSTURE: Demand verifiable action against TTP; defend self-defence; support documented, phased returns.

LEVERAGE: Military power; crossings and trade; refugee policy; ties with China and Gulf states.

RED LINE: No deal that normalizes TTP sanctuary or questions Pakistan's territorial integrity.

DEAL SPACE: Time-bound verification, intelligence cell, humanitarian exemptions and mediated incident rules.

China

CORE INTERESTS: Regional stability; CPEC security; prevent spillover into Xinjiang; protect citizens and investment.

LIKELY POSTURE: Push dialogue; press Kabul on terrorism; oppose uncontrolled conflict and outside domination.

LEVERAGE: Economic leverage; access to both capitals; Urumqi channel; Security Council influence.

RED LINE: No attacks on Chinese citizens or projects; no instability near Xinjiang.

DEAL SPACE: Lead guarantor for verification, infrastructure incentives and border reopening benchmarks.

India

CORE INTERESTS: Prevent anti-India militancy; protect Afghan sovereignty; limit Pakistani dominance; keep Afghan goodwill.

LIKELY POSTURE: Strong counter-terror language, but sceptical of broad unilateral force; support Afghan civilians and sovereignty.

LEVERAGE: Development ties; diplomacy; major-power partnerships; humanitarian aid.

RED LINE: No legitimacy for cross-border terrorism; no system controlled only by Pakistan or China.

DEAL SPACE: Support neutral evidence rules, humanitarian funding and multilateral monitoring.

Iran

CORE INTERESTS: Border security; Afghan refugees; water; Hazara and Shia protection; contain ISIL-K and hostile foreign forces.

LIKELY POSTURE: Oppose escalation and unsafe mass returns; engage Kabul pragmatically; resist a Western military role.

LEVERAGE: Long border; trade and fuel; refugee-hosting leverage; ties with Afghan factions.

RED LINE: No ISIL-K expansion, anti-Shia violence or permanent Western security presence.

DEAL SPACE: Regional contact group, refugee finance and trade-for-compliance incentives.

Russia

CORE INTERESTS: Recognition-led engagement; contain ISIL-K; reduce Western influence; stabilize Central Asia.

LIKELY POSTURE: Engage the Taliban government; condemn terrorism; favour regional solutions over sanctions-first diplomacy.

LEVERAGE: First formal recognition; Security Council veto; security ties in Central Asia.

RED LINE: No Western military return; no militant spillover into allied Central Asian states.

DEAL SPACE: Back a China-led or joint regional system with clear counter-terror benchmarks.

United States

CORE INTERESTS: Prevent external attacks; protect citizens and partners; human rights; detainees; keep sanctions leverage.

LIKELY POSTURE: Demand counter-terror and rights compliance; oppose unlawful civilian attacks; avoid unconditional recognition.

LEVERAGE: Sanctions, finance, intelligence, Security Council role, resettlement and aid.

RED LINE: No safe haven for external operations; no unconditional normalization of Taliban rule.

DEAL SPACE: Targeted exemptions, technical monitoring and humanitarian channels tied to conduct.

United Kingdom

CORE INTERESTS: Counter-terrorism; evacuation commitments; refugee protection; Pakistan ties; international law.

LIKELY POSTURE: Support accountability, non-return duties and counter-terror cooperation; resist premature recognition.

LEVERAGE: Diplomatic network, sanctions, aid, intelligence and Security Council seat.

RED LINE: No impunity for attacks on civilians; no abandonment of eligible Afghans.

DEAL SPACE: Legal drafting, evidence support, resettlement and calibrated sanctions.

Saudi Arabia

CORE INTERESTS: Mediation; Islamic legitimacy; Pakistani stability; prevent extremist mobilization.

LIKELY POSTURE: Promote ceasefire and quiet guarantees; avoid public alignment against either Muslim state.

LEVERAGE: Finance; religious and political influence; access to both parties.

RED LINE: No prolonged war destabilizing Pakistan or empowering transnational jihadists.

DEAL SPACE: Guarantee mechanism, reconstruction fund and phased incentives.

Qatar

CORE INTERESTS: Protect mediator role; keep Doha channel alive; prevent regional escalation.

LIKELY POSTURE: Support dialogue, ceasefire and practical mechanisms.

LEVERAGE: Trusted Taliban access; negotiation experience; ties with Western and regional states.

RED LINE: No collapse of mediation through public maximalism.

DEAL SPACE: Host technical talks, secretariat and compliance reviews.

Turkiye

CORE INTERESTS: Regional influence; Pakistan partnership; mediation credibility; trade and connectivity.

LIKELY POSTURE: Back Pakistan's security concerns while pressing dialogue and restraint; coordinate with Qatar.

LEVERAGE: Defence ties, diplomatic access and Istanbul negotiation track.

RED LINE: No exclusion from mediation; no uncontrolled extremist spillover.

DEAL SPACE: Co-chair verification and train border incident-prevention teams.

United Arab Emirates

CORE INTERESTS: Commercial access; counter-extremism; aviation and investment; regional competition.

LIKELY POSTURE: Pragmatic engagement with Kabul; support stability and controlled normalization.

LEVERAGE: Investment, air links, financial intelligence and channels to Afghan authorities.

RED LINE: No attacks on commercial assets; no uncontrolled sanctions exposure.

DEAL SPACE: Offer logistics, financial monitoring and reintegration investment.

Tajikistan

CORE INTERESTS: Secure long Afghan border; protect ethnic Tajik interests; prevent infiltration.

LIKELY POSTURE: More cautious toward Taliban than other Central Asian states; demand security and inclusion.

LEVERAGE: Border geography; regional security ties; links to Afghan opposition groups.

RED LINE: No extremist bases near its border; no marginalization of Afghan Tajiks.

DEAL SPACE: Join monitoring, early warning and northern humanitarian corridors.

Uzbekistan

CORE INTERESTS: Trade, rail, electricity exports and border stability.

LIKELY POSTURE: Pragmatic Taliban engagement; put commerce and security above recognition debates.

LEVERAGE: Transit links, electricity and diplomatic access.

RED LINE: No disruption to northern trade or militant penetration.

DEAL SPACE: Offer connectivity incentives tied to ceasefire and counter-terror compliance.

Turkmenistan

CORE INTERESTS: Neutrality; TAPI pipeline; border calm; energy exports.

LIKELY POSTURE: Low-profile engagement and non-interference; avoid bloc confrontation.

LEVERAGE: Energy projects, transit potential and quiet diplomacy.

RED LINE: No militarization of its frontier or pressure to join a security bloc.

DEAL SPACE: Offer neutral venue, energy incentives and technical border cooperation.

Kazakhstan

CORE INTERESTS: Central Asian stability; multilateral profile; trade and humanitarian credibility.

LIKELY POSTURE: Support regional dialogue, counter-terrorism and humanitarian aid.

LEVERAGE: Convening power, aid, regional institutions and balanced major-power ties.

RED LINE: No militant spillover or great-power confrontation in Central Asia.

DEAL SPACE: Provide neutral experts, finance and a review-conference venue.

Germany

CORE INTERESTS: Human rights; Afghan protection cases; aid; European security.

LIKELY POSTURE: Firm on women's rights and non-return; support accountability and targeted counter-terror action.

LEVERAGE: EU influence, aid, resettlement and technical funding.

RED LINE: No forced return of high-risk people; no unconditional recognition.

DEAL SPACE: Fund screening, reintegration and independent civilian-harm monitoring.

France

CORE INTERESTS: Counter-terrorism; international law; European security; rights and sanctions.

LIKELY POSTURE: Oppose terrorist safe havens and unlawful force; keep pressure on Taliban rights record.

LEVERAGE: Security Council seat, sanctions, intelligence and EU leadership.

RED LINE: No impunity for transnational attacks or abandonment of rights conditions.

DEAL SPACE: Support independent investigation and calibrated sanctions.

Canada

CORE INTERESTS: Refugee resettlement; human rights; women and girls; rules-based order.

LIKELY POSTURE: Protection-first, with targeted security cooperation rather than collective measures.

LEVERAGE: Resettlement, aid, coalition-building and technical expertise.

RED LINE: No return of vulnerable Afghans; no rights-blind normalization.

DEAL SPACE: Offer quotas, protection finance and gender-sensitive monitoring.

Japan

CORE INTERESTS: Human security; effective aid; regional stability; rules-based diplomacy.

LIKELY POSTURE: Support de-escalation, civilian protection and accountable development aid.

LEVERAGE: Major donor capacity, technical aid and low-threat mediator profile.

RED LINE: No diversion of aid to armed groups; no erosion of civilian safeguards.

DEAL SPACE: Finance reintegration, border infrastructure and independent evaluation.

* “Likely posture” is analytical inference, not an official mandate. Russia’s recognition is sourced at [24]; China’s April 2026 mediation posture at [23].

II. Bloc Analysis - Overlapping, Not Fixed

No useful coalition agrees on terrorism, refugees and the border at the same time. Build issue-specific majorities.

SECURITY-FIRST - WHO:

Pakistan at the centre; Turkiye and some partners sympathetic to its threat view. WANTS: Strong TTP action, intelligence sharing, sanctions and border control. FAULT LINE: How to stop self-defence language from becoming an unlimited licence for force.

SOVEREIGNTY + ENGAGEMENT - WHO:

Afghanistan, Russia, Iran and at times India or China, for different reasons. WANTS: Opposition to unilateral strikes, direct engagement with Kabul and regional ownership. FAULT LINE: How to link sovereignty to real action against groups operating from territory.

MEDIATOR CORRIDOR - WHO:

China, Qatar, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and potentially the UAE. WANTS: Ceasefire, quiet diplomacy, incentives and face-saving language. FAULT LINE: Who verifies, who chairs and whether mediators can share credit.

PROTECTION + ACCOUNTABILITY - WHO:

Germany, France, Canada, the UK, Japan and humanitarian partners. WANTS: Non-return rules, civilian protection, investigations, women’s rights and funded reintegration. FAULT LINE: How to secure access and compliance without isolating the authorities who control the ground.

CENTRAL ASIAN FIREWALL - WHO:

Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. WANTS: Prevent spillover, keep transit open and avoid a proxy contest. FAULT LINE: Different levels of trust toward the Taliban and different ties with Russia and China.

II.1 The coalition that can pass

The most plausible package is not a victory document for Kabul or Islamabad. It gives Pakistan measurable action against TTP; Afghanistan an end to strikes; both sides mediator-led verification; Afghans in Pakistan a protection floor; and the border a without-prejudice track. China can anchor security verification. Qatar and Turkiye can keep dialogue alive. Gulf states and donors can finance compliance. Rights-focused states can design protection and accountability.

II.2 The spoiler coalition

Spoilers do not need to cooperate. A TTP attack, an ISIL-K mass-casualty operation, a Pakistani strike with civilian deaths, an Afghan attack on a border post or a sudden deportation sweep can each destroy trust. Your framework must trigger costs and procedures based on verified conduct, not guessed motive.

NEGOTIATION TACTIC

Trade across files. Security-first states get verification and named duties. Sovereignty-focused states get a halt to strikes and non-prejudice language. Donors get access and audit rules. Mediators get a defined role. Refugees get enforceable screening and aid.

12. Key Non-State and Institutional Stakeholders

01 - UNAMA

Good offices, civilian-casualty recording, human rights and coordination. Its mandate was extended in June 2026. [4]

02 - UNHCR

Protection, registration, voluntary repatriation and monitoring. Essential for PoR holders and people with protection claims.

03 - IOM

Flow monitoring, transport and reintegration across documentation categories.

04 - ICRC / Red Crescent

Neutral humanitarian access, family links, medical help and dialogue on the laws of war.

05 - UN sanctions bodies

Listings, asset freezes, travel bans and analysis concerning ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated groups.

06 - TTP

Armed spoiler with an incentive to derail normalization and provoke overreaction.

07 - ISIL-K

Armed spoiler hostile to every negotiating party and able to attack civilians and foreign interests.

08 - Border communities and elders

Local route knowledge, legitimacy and early warning; they suffer first from closure and shelling.

09 - Transporters and traders

Can support legal commerce and verification, or move toward smuggling when crossings close.

10 - Women-led and refugee groups

Identify risks missed by state screening and design safer return and reintegration.

11 - Media and open-source investigators

Document harm and shape attribution, but also spread errors when evidence rules are weak.

12 - Donors and IFIs

Can fund host communities and reintegration, but cannot replace political settlement or guarantee access.

13. Applicable International Law

13.1 UN Charter: force and self-defence

Article 2(4) bars force against another state's territorial integrity or political independence. Article 51 preserves self-defence after an armed attack, but the response must be necessary and proportionate and must be reported to the Security Council. Article 33 requires peaceful settlement of dangerous disputes. [1]

The hard issue is force against a non-state actor in another state. Pakistan may argue that repeated TTP attacks amount to armed attacks and that Kabul is unwilling or unable to suppress the threat. Afghanistan may answer that attribution is unproven, the “unwilling or unable” theory is contested, and the strikes fail necessity or proportionality. International law does not give the committee an automatic answer.

13.2 Responsibility for armed groups

A state is not automatically responsible for every armed group on its territory. Attributing the group's attacks to the state generally requires a strong link such as instructions, direction or control. Separately, states must prevent certain harmful uses of their territory and comply with binding counter-terrorism duties.

13.3 Security Council counter-terror rules

Resolution 1373 requires states to suppress terrorist financing, deny safe haven and cooperate. The 1267 sanctions system applies targeted measures to listed ISIL and Al-Qaida-associated persons and entities, including TTP. Resolution 2593 (2021) demands that Afghan territory not be used to threaten or attack any country or to shelter, train, plan or finance terrorist acts. [3]

13.4 International humanitarian law

Once Afghanistan and Pakistan use armed force against each other, the law of international armed conflict applies. Parties must distinguish civilians from combatants and civilian objects from military objectives, respect proportionality and take feasible precautions. Hospitals and medical units have special protection. That protection can be lost only under strict conditions if a facility is used outside its humanitarian role for harmful acts. [10][20][21][22]

13.5 Refugee and human-rights law

Pakistan is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol. [18] That does not end the analysis. Pakistan is party to the Convention against Torture, whose Article 3 bars return where there are substantial grounds to believe a person would face torture. [19] Rights to life and freedom from torture can also create non-return duties in individual cases. UNHCR treats non-refoulement as a core protection principle. [14]

13.6 Boundary law

Pakistan relies on succession, stable boundaries and inherited title. Afghanistan points to colonial coercion, divided peoples and long-standing non-recognition. A committee cannot decide title. It can create a technical mapping process, a historical commission, an arbitration option or a practical border regime that is expressly without prejudice.

13.7 Claim-and-response grid

CLAIM	LEGAL RESPONSE TO TEST
“TTP attacks justify every strike.”	

	Self-defence still needs an armed attack, attribution or a defensible non-state-actor theory, necessity, proportionality and IHL compliance.
“Sovereignty forbids every response.”	Sovereignty is central, but it exists alongside counter-terror duties and the contested Article 51 analysis.
“Pakistan is outside the Refugee Convention, so return law does not apply.”	Other treaty and human-rights non-return duties still apply, especially the ban on return to torture.
“International recognition settles the Durand dispute.”	Practice strongly supports boundary stability, but Afghan non-recognition and the political dispute remain facts a deal must manage.

LEGAL DRAFTING RULE

Use “alleged”, “reported” and “verified by” when evidence is disputed. A political condemnation is not a judicial ruling. “Possible war crime” is not “war crime proven.”

14. Areas of Debate and Possible Solutions

Can Pakistan lawfully strike TTP targets in Afghanistan?

Test armed attack, target attribution, Afghan consent, necessity, proportionality and IHL compliance.

NEGOTIABLE PATH: Create a rapid evidence and de-confliction system while preserving both legal positions.

What must Kabul do about TTP?

A broad promise is empty. Disarmament may be difficult; relocation alone can move the threat.

NEGOTIABLE PATH: Register foreign fighters, close named facilities, restrict movement, disrupt finance, monitor cantonment, and use case-based prosecution or transfer.

Should the Durand Line be recognized now?

Pakistan treats the issue as settled; Kabul cannot easily concede without domestic backlash.

NEGOTIABLE PATH: Use a without-prejudice border accord now and a long-term legal-historical process later.

Are mass returns legitimate migration enforcement?

States may regulate stay, but categorical enforcement can breach individual non-return duties and create collective-punishment effects.

NEGOTIABLE PATH: Phase returns, exempt high-risk groups, provide appeals, fund host communities and expand legal stay and third-country routes.

Who verifies a ceasefire?

Neither party trusts the other, and foreign military monitors may be politically impossible.

NEGOTIABLE PATH: Use a small civilian-led body sponsored by China, Qatar and Türkiye, with UNAMA technical support and joint liaison teams.

Should sanctions be expanded or eased?

Broad sanctions can hurt civilians; unconditional relief can reward non-compliance.

NEGOTIABLE PATH: Use reversible targeted measures tied to verified conduct and humanitarian exemptions.

How should civilian harm be investigated?

National investigations may lack trust; international access may be denied.

NEGOTIABLE PATH: Use an independent panel, remote sensing, evidence preservation, witness protection and public interim reports.

Can security screening avoid discrimination?

Yes - when it is individual, time-limited and reviewable. Nationality is not proof.

NEGOTIABLE PATH: Combine biometric and documentary checks with privacy rules, UNHCR access and appeal.

15. A Settlement Architecture That Could Work

A ceasefire without verification collapses. Counter-terrorism without protection radicalizes. Border talks without a non-prejudice clause never begin.

Pillar 1 - Immediate silence

A renewable ceasefire should cover airstrikes, artillery, drones, raids and attacks on border posts. It should set buffer areas, medical evacuation rules and notice for exercises. It may allow proportionate defence against an attack in progress, but only with immediate hotline notice and review.

Pillar 2 - Separate terrorists from civilians

Use a confidential, name-based process for TTP and other listed entities. Screen refugees and migrants individually. Ban collective attribution. A camp or return centre cannot become a target merely because a suspect may be present.

Pillar 3 - Verify before accusing

A Joint Incident Verification Cell should receive allegations within six hours, preserve imagery and communications data, issue a preliminary review within 72 hours and publish a redacted finding within fourteen days. China, Qatar and Türkiye can nominate technical experts. UNAMA and ICRC should take part only within their mandates and with consent.

Pillar 4 - Protect and finance

Pause coercive returns during the first ceasefire window. Register undocumented Afghans, screen claims, renew lawful stay for vulnerable groups, fund Pakistani host districts, expand voluntary-return grants and monitor reintegration for twelve months. Donor money should be deposited, not merely promised.

Pillar 5 - Manage the frontier without prejudice

Create a technical border commission for disputed posts, crossings, customs, divided communities and mapping. Its work does not amount to Afghan recognition or Pakistani surrender of title. A later political track can choose negotiation, mediation, arbitration or continued practical management.

Enforcement ladder

- 1 **LEVEL 1**
Confidential clarification and hotline contact.
- 2 **LEVEL 2**
Public notice of non-compliance and emergency mediator meeting.
- 3 **LEVEL 3**
Suspend incentives; apply targeted travel or financial measures; refer to the Security Council.
- 4 **LEVEL 4**
Coordinate diplomatic consequences for repeated verified breach.

A 90-day implementation clock

- 1 **0-24 HOURS**
Ceasefire begins. Hotlines activate. Medical evacuation and evidence-preservation orders take effect.
- 2 **DAYS 2-7**
Liaison officers deploy. The high-risk return pause begins. Parties exchange the first incident files and crossing coordinates.
- 3 **DAYS 8-30**
TTP-related sites and financial controls are checked. Refugee registration expands. The host-community fund receives its first deposits.
- 4 **DAYS 31-60**
The border commission surveys disputed posts. The civilian-harm panel issues an interim evidence report.
- 5 **DAYS 61-90**
Ministers review benchmarks, renew or tighten measures and publish a redacted compliance scorecard.

AVOID THE IMPOSSIBLE PROMISE

“Eliminate terrorism” is not an operative clause. “Within 30 days, register named commanders, close identified facilities, freeze listed accounts and permit inspection of specified sites” is.

16. Questions a Resolution Must Answer

- 1 **01**
What is the legal and political basis of the G14 outcome? ANSWERED? ☐
- 2 **02**
How are Afghanistan and Pakistan described for representation and recognition? ANSWERED? ☐
- 3 **03**
Which acts does the ceasefire prohibit, and what narrow defensive actions remain allowed? ANSWERED? ☐
- 4 **04**
Who receives an allegation, what evidence is required, and when is a finding due? ANSWERED? ☐
- 5 **05**
What measurable steps must the Afghan de facto authorities take on TTP? ANSWERED? ☐
- 6 **06**
What measurable limits must Pakistan accept on cross-border force? ANSWERED? ☐
- 7 **07**
How are ISIL-K and Al-Qaida addressed without merging them with TTP or Afghan civilians? ANSWERED? ☐
- 8 **08**
How are sanctioned individuals listed, reviewed and removed with due process? ANSWERED? ☐
- 9 **09**
Which Afghan groups receive temporary protection, exemption, appeal or resettlement? ANSWERED? ☐
- 10 **10**
How is voluntary return distinguished from pressure-induced departure and deportation? ANSWERED? ☐
- 11 **11**
Who funds Pakistani host districts and Afghan reintegration, how much and when? ANSWERED? ☐
- 12 **12**
What safeguards cover women, children, minorities, former officials and rights defenders? ANSWERED? ☐
- 13 **13**
How do crossings stay open for trade, aid and medical cases during security incidents? ANSWERED? ☐
- 14 **14**
Does border cooperation affect either side's legal position on the Durand Line? ANSWERED? ☐
- 15 **15**
What are the mandate, membership and access rules of the monitoring body? ANSWERED? ☐

- 16 What happens after a first breach, a repeated breach and a mass-casualty event? ANSWERED? ☐
- 17 How will false attribution, disinformation and evidence tampering be handled? ANSWERED? ☐
- 18 What roles will UNAMA, UNHCR, IOM, ICRC and UN sanctions bodies play? ANSWERED? ☐
- 19 When is the agreement reviewed, renewed or ended? ANSWERED? ☐
- 20 What does success look like after 30 days, 90 days and one year? ANSWERED? ☐

RULES PRIORITY

This is a safe default. Your official rules of procedure, portfolio powers and dais instructions override it.

17. Crisis Mechanics and Delegate Strategy

17.1 Public instruments

- Communiqués state the committee's shared position and commitments.
- Directives authorize concrete action using available resources.
- Press statements shape the public story but can harden positions.
- Requests invite action by UN bodies, states or agencies outside G14 authority.

17.2 Private action

Private notes must stay within your portfolio and plausible national authority. Intelligence sharing, quiet mediation, funding, outreach and military posture changes should name the objective, actor, resource, method, timeline and risk control. "Stop TTP" is not a plan.

17.3 Newsflash triggers

TRIGGER	IMMEDIATE QUESTION	SMART RESPONSE
TTP mass-casualty attack	Is attribution independently verified?	Activate incident cell, preserve evidence and freeze escalation for 24 hours.
Airstrike with civilian deaths	Was the object military, and were precautions taken?	Secure medical access, preserve evidence, open an investigation and activate the hotline.
Crossing closure	What happens to aid, trade and returnees?	Open a humanitarian lane, add a sunset clause and review daily.
Deportation sweep	Were high-risk people screened?	Pause temporarily, allow UNHCR access, create appeal and fund host districts.
Fence-post dispute	Is this tactical construction or territorial change?	Freeze works, conduct a joint survey and use without-prejudice mediation.

ISIL-K attack	Will parties exploit the attack or jointly confront it?	Create a shared threat cell without merging all militant files.
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17.4 Escalation ladder

Rhetoric → border restriction → militant attack → local exchange → cross-border strike → sustained interstate fighting → regional intervention

A good directive moves the crisis one step down. A dramatic directive that jumps upward without political preparation should create consequences.

17.5 The one-page directive formula

Action. What happens? Actor. Who executes? Authority. Why can they? Resources. What do they use? Location. Where? Timeline. By when? Verification. How is success known? Contingency. What if blocked? Safeguard. How are civilians and law protected?

18. Sample G14 Outcome Framework

This is a drafting skeleton, not a final answer. Replace brackets with negotiated language and keep every duty measurable.

TITLEG14 Framework for the Cessation of Afghanistan-Pakistan Hostilities, Counter-Terrorism Verification, and Protection of Afghan Returnees

Preambular principles

Recalling Articles 2(4), 33 and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

Reaffirming Security Council resolution 2593 (2021) and applicable targeted sanctions;

Recognizing the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of Afghanistan and Pakistan;

Condemning attacks directed against civilians and terrorism in all forms;

Affirming the duties of distinction, proportionality and precautions under international humanitarian law;

Recognizing Pakistan's long hosting of Afghan populations and the need for fair cost-sharing;

Reaffirming non-return duties under applicable international law;

Noting that practical border cooperation shall be without prejudice to either party's legal position;

DRAFTING NOTE

Preambular language explains the legal and political frame. It does not create the mechanism. The operative section must name actors, deadlines, evidence, money and consequences.

Operative package

- 1 **1 - Ceasefire**
Stop airstrikes, artillery, drone attacks, raids and attacks on fixed border posts within [X] hours, subject to narrow emergency exceptions.
- 2 **2 - Hotline**
Create 24-hour military and political hotlines, tested daily and activated within 15 minutes of an incident.
- 3 **3 - Verification**
Create a [five/seven]-member Joint Incident Verification Cell with equal Afghan and Pakistani liaison officers and neutral experts nominated by [mediators].
- 4 **4 - Evidence**
Preserve and transfer radar, imagery, communications, casualty and site data under chain-of-custody rules.
- 5 **5 - TTP measures**
Within [30] days, identify named TTP leaders, close specified facilities, restrict finance and movement, and permit monitored action consistent with human rights.
- 6 **6 - No unilateral strike**
Require Pakistan to refrain from force in Afghan territory except as permitted by the Charter and to submit urgent threat files where time allows.
- 7 **7 - Protected-return pause**
Pause involuntary return for [90] days for PoR holders, ACC holders and anyone presenting a protection claim while screening is completed.
- 8 **8 - Screening and appeal**
Guarantee UNHCR access, written decisions, family unity, medical and child safeguards, and independent review.
- 9 **9 - Cost-sharing**
Create a pledged fund for Pakistani host districts and Afghan reintegration with public quarterly audits.
- 10 **10 - Crossings**
Keep named humanitarian and commercial lanes open, subject to individual security checks.
- 11 **11 - Border track**
Create a technical commission on posts, mapping, divided communities and customs, expressly without prejudice to final status.
- 12 **12 - Civilian harm**
Request an independent investigation into high-casualty incidents, including preservation of evidence from the 16 March 2026 Kabul strike.
- 13 **13 - Compliance**
Use a ladder of clarification, public notice, incentive suspension and referral for repeated verified breach.
- 14 **14 - Review**
Hold ministerial reviews after [30], [90] and [365] days using published benchmarks.

19. Research Method and Position Paper Guide

19.1 Build a verified country line

- 1 **1 - START WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY**
Find the latest official statements on Afghanistan, Pakistan, terrorism, refugees and recognition.
- 2 **2 - CHECK VOTES AND TREATIES**
Review UN votes, sanctions duties, refugee and human-rights treaties, and formal recognition policy.
- 3 **3 - MAP MATERIAL INTERESTS**
Trade, borders, citizens, investments, military ties, aid, refugee numbers and mediation channels.
- 4 **4 - SEPARATE PUBLIC POSTURE FROM PRIVATE INTEREST**
A state may speak about law while privately prioritizing access, security or alliance management.
- 5 **5 - WRITE RED LINES AND CONCESSIONS**
If you cannot state both, you do not yet have a negotiating strategy.

19.2 Position paper structure

Paragraph 1 - Diagnosis: What caused the crisis? Attribute disputed claims. Paragraph 2 - Record: What has your country done, funded, voted for or proposed? Paragraph 3 - Policy: Give three mechanisms, two red lines and one concession. Paragraph 4 - Implementation: Name authority, money, verification and consequences.

19.3 Source hierarchy

- Tier 1: UN documents, treaty texts, official releases, UNHCR, IOM, UNAMA and ICRC data.
- Tier 2: Reuters, Associated Press and established research institutions with transparent sourcing.
- Tier 3: Advocacy groups for documented rights findings, clearly identified as advocacy.
- Avoid: Unsourced casualty claims, anonymous graphics, partisan accounts and search snippets without the underlying report.

19.4 Five-minute speech

OPEN

“This committee will fail if it treats [security / refugees / the border] as a separate file.”

Name one verified fact.

State your country's interest.

Offer one mechanism and say who verifies it.

End with a trade: “We will support X if the committee guarantees Y.”

19.5 Clause quality check

Circle every verb. If it says “encourages”, ask whether the issue needs a stronger commitment. Underline every institution. If no actor is named, the clause is empty. Box every deadline and funding source. If none exist, implementation is imaginary.

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RESEARCH INTEGRITY

Numbers change and access can fail. In speeches, cite the institution and date, not only the figure. For disputed incidents, state both the verified finding and the party's response.