

Country	Bloc / Structural Role	Primary Role / Interest	Position	Likely Partners
United States	Major Exporter (Non-ATT)	World's largest arms exporter (42% of global exports, 2021-25); withdrew from ATT April 2025	Defends sovereign licensing discretion; favours bilateral end-use monitoring over multilateral verification; wary of any body reviewing US export decisions	UK, Israel, South Korea, Gulf states
Russian Federation	Major Exporter (Non-ATT)	Major legacy exporter; extensive history of embargo evasion and proxy brokering (Wagner/Africa Corps networks)	Rejects Western-led transparency initiatives as politicised; defends arms exports to Global South partners as sovereign right; opposes new binding verification bodies	China, Belarus, Iran, North Korea
China	Major Exporter (Non-ATT, Non-Wassenaar)	Rapidly growing exporter, especially drones and light weapons to Africa/Asia; not party to ATT or Wassenaar	Frames Western export-control regimes as protectionist; supports UNPoA-style non-binding cooperation; resists beneficial-ownership disclosure mandates	Russia, Pakistan, Global South importers
France	Major Exporter (ATT)	World's 2nd-largest exporter; ATT depositary-region leader	Supports ATT universalisation and brokering regulation; defends strategic export relationships (India, Egypt, Gulf); resists independent verification of licensing decisions	Germany, UK, EU states
United Kingdom	Major Exporter (ATT); 2026 broker-prosecution precedent	Major exporter with a recent high-profile domestic brokering prosecution	Advocates strengthened brokering-registration requirements based on its own enforcement experience; promotes 5-year ATT revitalisation strategy	France, EU states, Canada
Germany	Major Exporter (ATT)	World's 4th-largest exporter; historically strict (if inconsistently applied) end-use rules	Strong rhetorical support for tighter EU-wide dual-use and brokering controls; domestic political pressure over exports to conflict zones	France, Netherlands, Nordic states
Italy	Major Exporter (ATT)	6th-largest global exporter; rapidly rising export share	Balances defence-industrial growth with ATT compliance rhetoric; historic scrutiny over exports transiting to embargoed destinations	Spain, France
Spain	Major Exporter (ATT)	Rising mid-tier exporter (+29% export growth)	Supports EU-coordinated export control harmonisation; sensitive to human-rights conditionality debates	Italy, Germany
Israel	Major Exporter (Non-Wassenaar, ATT non-signatory)	Top-10 exporter, especially drones, precision-guided munitions, cyber/surveillance tech	Resists external oversight of security-related exports; defends bilateral end-user vetting as sufficient; opposes broad dual-use definitions capturing its tech sector	United States, India, select Gulf/Abraham Accords states
Republic of Korea	Major Exporter (ATT, Wassenaar)	Fast-growing top-10 exporter (Europe rearmament driven)	Supports rules-based export order; seeks to protect newly won market share from over-regulation	United States, Poland, EU states
Ukraine	Major Importer / Wartime Grey-Zone Risk	World's largest single arms importer 2021-25; wartime influx raises major diversion-risk concerns	Seeks continued Western supply while defending its own end-use controls against diversion allegations; supports post-war weapons accountability mechanisms	United States, Poland, EU/NATO states
Turkey	Exporter, Transit State, Wassenaar member	Significant mid-tier arms and drone exporter; historically used as a transit route into Syria/Libya theatres	Balances NATO-aligned export posture with independent regional arms-transfer relationships; resists intrusive transit-verification obligations	Azerbaijan, Gulf states, Pakistan
Netherlands	Regulation-Forward Exporter (ATT, Wassenaar)	Mid-tier exporter; strong domestic dual-use enforcement culture	Champions binding brokering registration and beneficial-ownership	Germany, Nordic states, Switzerland

Country	Bloc / Structural Role	Primary Role / Interest	Position	Likely Partners
			transparency; active in EU dual-use list updates	
Sweden	Regulation-Forward Exporter (ATT, Wassenaar)	Mid-tier exporter with historically strict human-rights export criteria	Advocates strong Article 7 risk-assessment standards and civil-society consultation in licensing	Netherlands, Norway, Finland
Czech Republic	Mid-Tier Exporter / Former Transit Hotspot (ATT)	Historic post-Soviet surplus stockpile exporter; past diversion controversies	Supports EU harmonisation while defending its defence-export sector's competitiveness	Slovakia, Bulgaria, Serbia
Bulgaria	Mid-Tier Exporter / Legacy Diversion Concern (ATT)	Major exporter of Soviet-legacy-pattern ammunition and small arms, some diverted into Middle Eastern conflict zones	Defends legality of its licensed exports; supports (cautiously) enhanced end-use monitoring to rebut diversion allegations	Serbia, Czech Republic, Romania
Serbia	Mid-Tier Exporter / Balkans Diversion Corridor (Non-ATT)	Rapidly growing arms exporter; repeatedly implicated in onward diversion to Middle Eastern conflicts via third-country triangulation	Resists binding EU-style controls as sovereignty infringement; frames itself as a legal exporter not responsible for buyers' onward re-export	Russia, Gulf intermediary states
Brazil	Regional Exporter / Importer (ATT)	Latin America's leading arms producer; also a major destination for illicitly diverted small arms (cartel/criminal markets)	Advocates stronger controls on illicit trafficking into criminal markets; supports UNPoA and Firearms Protocol implementation funding	Colombia, Mexico, regional Latin American states
Saudi Arabia	Major Importer (ATT signatory, not ratified)	World's largest single arms importer (9%+ of global imports)	Defends unrestricted procurement as a sovereign security necessity amid regional threats; resists human-rights-based export conditionality	UAE, Qatar, United States
United Arab Emirates	Major Importer / Re-Export & Transit Concern (ATT)	Top-10 importer; repeatedly named in UN Panel of Experts reports as a transit/re-export node for diverted weapons into Libya, Sudan, and other embargoed destinations	Denies facilitating onward diversion; frames itself as a legitimate regional logistics and re-export hub requiring capacity support rather than sanction	Saudi Arabia, United States, France
Qatar	Major Importer (ATT)	Significant importer; regional mediator role	Supports dialogue-based approaches; sensitive to being associated with regional proxy-arming allegations	Saudi Arabia, UAE, Turkey
Egypt	Major Importer / Historic Diversion Destination (ATT)	Top-10 importer; historically named in Sudan and Libya-related arms-flow reporting	Defends sovereign procurement rights; supports regional (African Union / Arab League) rather than externally imposed monitoring mechanisms	Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Gulf states
Pakistan	Major Importer / Regional Exporter (ATT non-signatory)	Significant importer and small-arms producer with informal cross-border trafficking concerns (Afghanistan border region)	Frames illicit trafficking as primarily a regional/Afghan-border enforcement issue; wary of India-aligned initiatives	China, Turkey
India	Major Importer / Rising Exporter (ATT non-signatory)	World's 2nd-largest importer; growing indigenous defence-export ambitions; Wassenaar chair (2023)	Supports transparency initiatives in principle; defends its own non-ATT status as consistent with sovereign strategic autonomy; wary of measures that could constrain its expanding export ambitions	France, Russia, United States (diversified supply)
Poland	Major Importer (ATT)	One of Europe's three largest importers amid rearmament	Strongly supports tightened Belarus/Russia-adjacent transit and diversion controls; advocates robust Eastern-flank end-use verification	Ukraine, Baltic states, United States
Japan	Major Importer / Cautious Exporter (ATT, Wassenaar)	Significant importer; recently eased self-imposed export restrictions	Champions strict ATT implementation and Indo-Pacific transparency; supports capacity-building for Southeast Asian partners	United States, Australia, South Korea

Country	Bloc / Structural Role	Primary Role / Interest	Position	Likely Partners
Australia	Importer / Regional Capacity-BUILDER (ATT, Wassenaar)	Advocates Indo-Pacific regional arms-control capacity building and Pacific Islands brokering-loophole closure	Strong ATT and UNPoA supporter; funds regional customs and marking/tracing capacity programmes	Japan, New Zealand, Pacific Island states
Panama	Flag-of-Convenience / Offshore Registry Hub	One of the world's largest ship-registry states; historically linked to flagged vessels used in arms-smuggling interdictions	Defends registry revenue and sovereign right to regulate its own shipping registry; resists mandatory beneficial-ownership disclosure for registered vessels	Marshall Islands, Liberia (observer interests), Panama Canal stakeholders
Cyprus	Offshore Financial/Corporate Hub, EU Member (ATT)	EU member with historic scrutiny over shell-company and offshore-finance use in sanctions-evasion cases	Balances EU-level transparency obligations against domestic offshore-services sector interests; supports FATF-aligned reform rhetorically	EU states, Malta
Malta	Offshore Corporate/Flag Registry Hub, EU Member (ATT)	EU flag registry with beneficial-ownership transparency concerns raised by FATF and EU partners	Publicly supports EU dual-use and beneficial-ownership frameworks while defending its registry's competitiveness	Cyprus, other EU registry states
Marshall Islands	Flag-of-Convenience Registry Hub	One of the largest open ship registries globally; minimal beneficial-ownership verification	Frames registry openness as a legitimate sovereign revenue model; resists new mandatory vetting requirements as commercially damaging	Panama, Liberia (observer interests)
Republic of Moldova	Transit / Border-Vulnerability State (ATT)	Small state bordering conflict-affected Transnistria; historic concern as a Balkans/Black Sea trafficking transit route	Strongly supports EU-backed border and customs capacity-building; advocates enhanced regional information-sharing	Ukraine, Romania, EU states
Libya	Fragmented State / UN-Embargoed Destination	Subject to a UN Security Council arms embargo since 2011; a primary global destination and onward-trafficking hub for diverted weapons since the 2011 conflict	Government of National Unity delegation calls for embargo enforcement against rival factions while defending its own procurement needs; deep contestation over legitimate representation	Egypt, Turkey (rival factional patrons), UN Support Mission in Libya
Sudan	Conflict State / UN-Embargoed Region (Darfur)	Ongoing civil war since 2023; subject to a partial (Darfur-region) UN arms embargo; major documented diversion destination	Contested representation amid civil war; competing factions blame external states (including neighbours and Gulf actors) for embargo violations	Egypt, African Union
Yemen	Conflict State / UN-Embargoed (Houthi-linked)	Subject to a UN Security Council embargo on Houthi forces; documented Iranian arms-smuggling routes via small-boat trafficking	Internationally recognised government delegation calls for stronger maritime interdiction; disputes over legitimate representation given ongoing civil conflict	Saudi Arabia, UAE
Syria	Post-Conflict Transitional State	Post-2024 transitional context; historically both a recipient of illicit external arms flows and a major source of black-market weapons circulating regionally	Transitional government seeks international support for stockpile security and demobilisation; wary of measures that could be read as continued isolation	Turkey, Gulf states, UN agencies
Somalia	Conflict State / Partial UN Embargo	Longstanding partial arms embargo (progressively eased for government forces); weapons diversion to Al-Shabaab a persistent concern	Government delegation supports continued embargo easing paired with stronger federal stockpile-management capacity support	African Union, Kenya, Ethiopia
Mali	Conflict State / Sahel Diversion Corridor	Central node in Sahel weapons-trafficking routes linked to jihadist and separatist armed groups	Emphasises Sahel-wide regional cooperation and criticises perceived great-power indifference to trafficking fuelling regional instability	Niger, Burkina Faso, African Union
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Conflict State / UN Group of Experts Focus	Long-running UN Group of Experts reporting on regional arms flows to	Calls for stronger regional (Great Lakes) end-use verification and sanctions	African Union, Southern African Development Community states

Country	Bloc / Structural Role	Primary Role / Interest	Position	Likely Partners
		non-state armed groups in the eastern DRC	enforcement against named diversion networks	
Myanmar	Conflict State / UN Embargo Recommendation (Non-Wassenaar)	Subject to General Assembly calls for an arms embargo amid ongoing civil conflict; documented illicit small-arms manufacturing and cross-border trafficking	Military authorities reject international oversight as interference in internal affairs; opposition/ethnic-resistance delegations (where recognised) call for embargo enforcement	China, Russia (defends against embargo calls)
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Sanctioned Pariah Supplier (ATT: voted against)	Subject to comprehensive UN Security Council sanctions including an arms embargo; documented arms exports to Russia and historically to Iran/Syria via illicit networks	Rejects Council sanctions regime as illegitimate; frames its own arms transfers as sovereign bilateral cooperation outside UN jurisdiction	Russia (arms-for-technology arrangements)
Iran	Sanctioned Pariah Supplier (ATT: voted against)	Subject to targeted arms-related sanctions; documented supplier of drones and light weapons to regional proxies and (reportedly) Russia	Rejects sanctions regime as unilateral coercion; defends transfers to allied states/groups as legitimate sovereign cooperation	Russia, Syria (historic), regional proxy networks
Belarus	Sanctioned Supplier / Transit State	Subject to EU/US sanctions since 2022; alleged transit and re-export role for Russia-bound and Russia-origin materiel; not a Wassenaar member	Rejects Western sanctions as politically motivated; aligns closely with Russian positions on all agenda items	Russia
Switzerland	Regulation Champion / Neutral Diplomatic Hub (ATT, Wassenaar)	Host state for major disarmament diplomacy (Geneva); mid-tier exporter with strict domestic war-material export law	Advocates strengthened ATT universalisation, hosts Small Arms Survey; balances neutrality with support for binding verification tools	Nordic states, Netherlands, Austria
South Africa	Regulation Champion / Regional Exporter (ATT)	Continental leader in small-arms-control diplomacy; mid-tier regional exporter	Strong advocate for African Union-coordinated small-arms control, UNPoA implementation funding, and Global South-led (not externally imposed) verification frameworks	Nigeria, Kenya, African Union bloc
Nigeria	Importer / Regional Diversion Destination (ATT)	West Africa's largest state; major destination for trafficked small arms fuelling internal insurgencies (Boko Haram, banditry)	Leading advocate for ECOWAS-aligned regional trafficking controls and stronger marking/tracing cooperation with supplier states	South Africa, ECOWAS member states
Mexico	Importer / Illicit Trafficking Destination (ATT)	Major destination for illicitly trafficked firearms from the United States fuelling cartel violence, a signature south-bound trafficking corridor distinct from the conflict-zone pattern elsewhere on the agenda	Strong advocate for binding U.S. dealer- and gun-show-level export accountability and cross-border tracing cooperation; has pursued litigation against U.S. manufacturers	Colombia, Latin American bloc, Caribbean states
Colombia	Importer / Regional Trafficking Concern (ATT)	Historic destination for trafficked weapons linked to non-state armed groups and organised crime	Supports UNPoA and Firearms Protocol implementation funding; favours regional Latin American tracing cooperation frameworks	Mexico, Brazil, regional bloc