# IYC 2026

# Global Security Organization

## Study Guide

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## Letter from the Executive Board

**Honorable Delegates,**

We are thrilled to welcome you to the **Global Security Organization (GSO)** at the **International Youth Conference.** As one of IYC's largest committees, we will deliberate on an agenda that is not merely topical but actively unfolding: "Deliberating upon the Security and Stability of the Strait of Hormuz and its Implications for Global Trade, Energy Security, and International Peace."

Twenty-one nautical miles of water at its narrowest point determine whether roughly a fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas reaches the refineries, power stations and fertilizer plants that fuel and feed much of humanity. Since 28 February 2026 that passage has been threatened, mined, tolled, blockaded, reopened and closed again. Ships have burned. Seafarers have died. Crude has traded above $120 a barrel. Governments that had never given the Strait a second thought have discovered that their electricity tariffs, their harvests and their industrial output all run through it.

Over the course of two days, delegates will engage in intense debate, nuanced discussion and collaborative problem-solving. This agenda asks you to hold several truths at once: that freedom of navigation is a cornerstone of the international legal order; that a coastal state's sovereignty and security concerns are not illegitimate merely because they are inconvenient; that markets and insurers respond to risk in ways no communiqué can command; and that the people most harmed by a closed waterway are rarely the people who closed it.

We urge you to look well beyond this background guide. Read Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Read the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. Read what the International Maritime Organization has said about transit charges, and what the London insurance market has done to war-risk premiums. Understand your own country's tanker routes, its strategic reserves, its refinery slate and its seafarers. The delegate who knows how many days of crude cover their nation holds will speak with an authority that rhetoric cannot manufacture.

We are not asking you to solve the Middle East. We are asking you to answer a narrower and more answerable question: under what conditions can twenty million barrels a day move safely through a waterway that one state can physically dominate, without that state being either rewarded for coercion or humiliated into further escalation?

We eagerly anticipate the insight, creativity and diplomacy that each of you will bring to the table. By engaging actively, questioning critically and collaborating constructively, we are confident that you will shape discussions that resonate far beyond the conference walls.

**Welcome to the Global Security Organization. Warm regards,**

**Yuvaditya Deora, Chair**

**Ambika Duhlani, Vice Chair**

## Introduction

The **Strait of Hormuz** is the narrow sea passage connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and, beyond it, the Arabian Sea and the wider Indian Ocean. At its narrowest it is about 21 nautical miles (39 kilometers) across. Its two one-way shipping lanes, each roughly two miles wide and separated by a two-mile buffer, lie almost entirely within the territorial waters of Iran to the north and Oman to the south. There is no alternative sea route out of the Gulf.

Under normal conditions roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day and about a fifth of internationally traded liquefied natural gas move through it — Saudi, Emirati, Kuwaiti, Iraqi, Qatari and Iranian hydrocarbons bound overwhelmingly for Asia. In 2024 an estimated 84 per cent of the crude and condensate leaving the Strait was destined for Asian markets, with China alone drawing about a third of its oil through it. Europe takes some 12 to 14 per cent of its LNG from Qatar by the same route. The Gulf also supplies a large share of the world's urea and ammonia, around a third of its helium and a fifth of raw aluminum exports. Hormuz is therefore not only an energy chokepoint but a food-security and industrial one.

The waterway has been a flashpoint before. The "Tanker War" of the 1980s, Operation Praying Mantis in 1988, the closure threats of 2011 and 2012, the limpet-mine attacks and the seizure of the Stena Impero in 2019, and the Twelve-Day War of June 2025, when Iran's parliament voted to support closure — each of these tested the Strait. Each time it stayed open.

In 2026 it did not. On 28 February 2026 the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Within hours the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was broadcasting VHF warnings that no vessel would be permitted to pass. Tanker traffic fell by roughly 70 per cent and then to almost nothing. Merchant ships were struck by drones, missiles and small boats. Mines were laid. Satellite navigation signals were jammed and spoofed. War-risk cover was withdrawn on 5 March, and a strait that remained technically open became commercially impassable. Brent crude passed $100 for the first time in four years and peaked near $126; Dubai crude reached a record $166. Qatar Energy declared force majeure. Roughly 20,000 seafarers and 2,000 ships were stranded inside the Gulf.

What has followed is a cycle rather than a resolution: a two-week ceasefire in April, a United States naval blockade of Iranian ports, Iran's creation of a Persian Gulf Strait Authority to license and charge for transits, a Russian and Chinese veto of a Gulf-drafted Security Council resolution, the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding in June promising sixty days of toll-free passage, and by July renewed American strikes, renewed attacks on merchant shipping and traffic collapsing once more. As this guide goes to print the Strait is open in law, contested in practice, and closed in the judgement of most underwriters.

This committee must decide what the international community can legitimately and practically do about it.

## Freeze Date - 15th August 2026

## History of the Agenda

**1971:** *British withdrawal and the disputed islands.* As the United Kingdom ended its protectorate role east of Suez, Iran took control of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, islands astride the approaches to the Strait. The United Arab Emirates has claimed them ever since. Possession of these islands, together with Qeshm, Hormuz and Larak, underpins Iran's ability to observe and interdict traffic today.

**1980–1988:** *The Iran–Iraq War and the "Tanker War."* Both belligerents attacked commercial shipping serving the other. Kuwait requested protection, and the United States reflagged Kuwaiti tankers under Operation Earnest Will and escorted convoys. In April 1988 Operation Praying Mantis destroyed much of Iran's operational navy after the USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian mine. In July 1988 the USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655, killing 290 civilians — an episode still central to Iranian strategic memory and to Tehran's framing of American naval presence.

**1982:** *UNCLOS is adopted.* The Convention codified the regime of transit passage through straits used for international navigation, a right the coastal state may not suspend or impede. Iran signed but never ratified it. The United States has also never ratified it, though it treats the navigational provisions as customary international law. This double non-ratification sits underneath every legal argument advanced in 2026.

**2011–2012:** *The first closure threats.* Facing European and American sanctions on its oil exports, Iranian officials threatened to close the Strait, and naval exercises followed. Traffic was never seriously interrupted. The episode established a pattern that held for fifteen years: threat, deterrent deployment, de-escalation.

**2015–2018:** *The nuclear agreement and its collapse.* The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action briefly lowered tension. The United States withdrew in 2018 and reimposed "maximum pressure" sanctions, cutting off Iran's lawful oil exports and giving Tehran a rationale it has repeated ever since: if Iran cannot export through the Gulf, no one will.

**2019:** *Limpet mines and seizures.* Six tankers were damaged near Fujairah and in the Gulf of Oman. Iran downed an American surveillance drone and seized the British-flagged Stena Impero. The International Maritime Security Construct and the European-led EMASOH mission were created in response — the first modern templates for escorting in these waters.

**2023–2025:** *Compounding chokepoints.* Houthi attacks closed much of the Red Sea to Western-linked shipping, pushing traffic around the Cape of Good Hope and proving that a non-state actor with anti-ship missiles could reroute global trade. In June 2025 the Twelve-Day War brought Israeli and then American strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities; Iran's parliament voted to support closing Hormuz, but the Supreme National Security Council never acted on it.

**February 2026:** *The threshold is crossed.* After Oman-mediated nuclear talks in Geneva collapsed, Iran tripled export volumes and drew down storage in anticipation of attack, and Saudi Arabia took similar precautions. War-risk premiums rose from about 0.125 per cent of hull value per transit to between 0.2 and 0.4 per cent — a quarter of a million dollars for a very large crude carrier. The Joint Chiefs of Staff warned President Trump that strikes could prompt closure; he judged that Iran would capitulate instead, and that if it did not, the United States military could reopen the Strait. On 28 February the strikes came, and closure followed.

## Key Definitions

**Strait of Hormuz:** The waterway linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, about 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest, bordered by Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south. Its designated traffic separation scheme lies largely within Omani territorial waters off the Musandam Peninsula.

**Chokepoint:** A narrow maritime passage through which a disproportionate share of world trade must pass and for which no rapid substitute exists. Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Suez, Malacca and Panama are the principal examples; the 2026 crisis closed two of them simultaneously.

**Transit Passage (UNCLOS Part III):** The regime governing straits used for international navigation. Ships and aircraft of all states enjoy continuous and expeditious passage which the bordering state may not suspend, hamper or charge for. It is a stronger right than innocent passage.

**Innocent Passage:** The right to traverse territorial waters provided passage is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state. It may be suspended temporarily and does not cover aircraft or submerged submarines. Iran has at times argued that states which are not parties to UNCLOS may claim only innocent passage, and that belligerent vessels forfeit even that.

**Freedom of Navigation:** The customary principle that the seas remain open to the shipping of all states. The United States conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations to contest maritime claims it regards as excessive.

**Naval Blockade:** A belligerent measure sealing an adversary's ports and coastline. To be lawful it must be declared, notified, effective and impartially applied, and must not starve the civilian population. Iran characterized the American blockade of its ports from 13 April 2026 as an act of war; Washington characterized it as sanctions enforcement that did not impede transits to non-Iranian ports.

**Force Majeure:** A declaration that a supplier cannot meet contractual delivery because of events beyond its control. Qatar Energy, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, Bahrain's Bapco Energies and Iraq all declared force majeure in March 2026, converting a shipping crisis into a contractual and financial one.

**War-Risk Insurance and P&I Cover:** Marine insurance against war, terrorism and seizure, and protection-and-indemnity cover for third-party liability. When the London market's Joint War Committee widens a listed high-risk area or underwriters withdraw cover, a strait can become impassable in commercial terms without a shot being fired.

**Dark Transit and AIS Spoofing:** Switching off or falsifying Automatic Identification System transponders. By mid-July 2026 close to seventy per cent of observed Hormuz transits were "dark," which frustrates attackers but also cripples sanctions enforcement, casualty response and any impartial verification of what is actually happening in the Strait.

**Shadow Fleet:** Ageing, opaquely owned and frequently uninsured tankers used to move sanctioned crude. Their growing share of Hormuz traffic raises the prospect of a major spill for which no owner can be identified and no insurer will pay.

**Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA):** An Iranian government agency established on 5 May 2026 to authorize, route and levy charges on transits. The United States Treasury designated it in May as an IRGC-linked extortion mechanism; five Arab Gulf states formally rejected it in a joint letter that Oman declined to sign.

**Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding:** The fourteen-point framework signed by the United States and Iran on 17 June 2026, mediated principally by Pakistan and Qatar. It provided for the lifting of the

American blockade, sixty days of toll-free commercial passage, and a dialogue between Iran and Oman, with the other Gulf states, to define the future administration of and maritime services in the Strait.

**Bypass Infrastructure:** Pipelines reaching tidewater outside the Gulf — Saudi Arabia's East–West line to Yanbu, the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline to Fujairah, and Iraq's Kirkuk–Ceyhan line to the Mediterranean. Their combined capacity is roughly 9 million barrels per day against the 20 million that normally transits Hormuz.

## Current Situation

Legally, the Strait of Hormuz is open. Practically, it is not.

Since the Islamabad Memorandum was signed on 17 June 2026, the United States has lifted its naval blockade of Iranian ports and Iran's Supreme National Security Council has decreed a sixty-day window in which no fees would be levied. Traffic recovered—and then collapsed again. The dispute is no longer about whether ships may pass, but about who authorizes them to pass. Through the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, Iran requires vessels to file transit requests and to use routes it designates, including a channel north of Larak Island rather than the internationally recognized lanes to the south. Washington argues that the Memorandum obliges Iran to make arrangements for safe passage but confers no right to license it, and that no state may condition transit through an international waterway. Secretary of State Rubio has framed the stake plainly: if a charge is accepted at Hormuz because a state happens to sit beside it, the practice will spread to five other chokepoints.

Between late June and mid-July that disagreement repeatedly turned kinetic. Iranian forces fired on vessels transiting by routes Tehran had not approved. United States Central Command responded with successive waves of strikes—around 90 targets on 8 July, roughly 140 on 11 July, and six consecutive nights of strikes in the week of 13 July, extending on 16 July to a tanker near Kharg Island deep inside the Gulf. The IRGC retaliated against American facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan, and struck Prince Hassan Air Base. Washington revoked the general license for Iranian oil sales that it had issued in June, reversing one of the Memorandum's central concessions.

The market has responded exactly as it did in March. Transits by ships with no Iranian nexus fell from 108 to 25 in the single week of 13 to 19 July; total traffic is down roughly 90 per cent year on year; inbound movements have nearly stopped, because owners will send a ship out of the Gulf but not into it. Nearly seventy per cent of observed transits are conducted dark. Brent has settled near $90 after peaking around $126 in March. A United States-backed southern corridor through Omani waters remains available and lightly used. The Joint Maritime Information Center in Bahrain has moved its threat assessment between "severe" and "substantial" more than once in a month.

Diplomatically the architecture is crowded and inconclusive. Oman and Qatar mediate; Pakistan hosts; France and the United Kingdom have convened coalitions of interested states and are studying an Omani proposal under which navigational service fees might be levied with International Maritime Organization oversight—a formula the Gulf Cooperation Council and Washington have so far rejected as tolling under another name. The Security Council remains blocked: the Bahrain-led draft of 7 April, already stripped of any authorization of force, failed on Russian and Chinese vetoes with eleven votes in favor, two against and two abstentions.

Meanwhile the human and economic damage accumulates. Seafarers have been killed and ships abandoned; a tugboat sent to assist a stricken vessel was itself sunk. Fertilizer prices rose sharply into the Northern Hemisphere planting season, and unlike oil, fertilizer has no internationally coordinated strategic reserve. Helium is being rationed. Aluminum smelting has been cut. Egypt's canal revenues have fallen again as carriers reroute around the Cape. The costs are borne disproportionately by states that had no part in the quarrel and no seat at the table where it is being settled.

## Timeline (2025– Present)

**14 November 2025** — Iran seizes a Marshall Islands-flagged tanker in the Strait. Further seizures of vessels alleged to be smuggling fuel follow through November and December.

**4 December 2025** — The United States National Security Strategy names keeping the Strait of Hormuz open as a core American interest, alongside a navigable Red Sea and Israeli security.

**February 2026** — Oman-mediated nuclear talks in Geneva fail. A senior IRGC commander states that Iran is ready to close the Strait whenever the order is issued. Iran triples oil exports and draws down storage; Saudi Arabia takes similar precautions; war-risk premiums roughly double.

**28 February 2026** — *Operation Epic Fury.* American and Israeli strikes across Iran kill Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and much of the senior military leadership. Within hours the IRGC broadcasts VHF warnings that no ship may pass. Tanker traffic falls about 70 per cent and more than 150 ships anchor outside the Strait. The Houthis announce the resumption of Red Sea attacks, closing both regional chokepoints at once.

**1–2 March 2026** — The tanker Skylight is struck off Khasab, killing two Indian crew; the MKD VYOM is hit by a drone boat, killing another. A US-flagged tanker is struck in Bahrain's port, killing a port worker. A senior IRGC official confirms the Strait is closed. No AIS signals are observed in the Strait. Qatar Energy halts gas production.

**4–8 March 2026** — Qatar Energy declares force majeure; European gas prices jump by as much as 45 per cent. War-risk P&I cover is withdrawn from 5 March. Kuwait Petroleum Corporation declares force majeure on 7 March. Brent passes $100 on 8 March for the first time in four years. Iraq begins shutting in the Rumaila field for want of storage. Reports emerge that Chinese-linked vessels are being allowed through.

**10–11 March 2026** — American intelligence reports Iranian mine-laying; the United States destroys sixteen minelayers. The 32 member states of the International Energy Agency agree to release 400 million barrels from emergency reserves — about four days of global consumption. The G7 begins studying escort operations.

**12–19 March 2026** — Mojtaba Khamenei, the new Supreme Leader, states that closure of the Strait "must remain a priority." Saudi Arabia cuts output by 20 per cent after damage to offshore fields; Gulf production falls by at least 10 million barrels per day. Dubai crude reaches a record $166 on 19 March. Germany, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, Romania and the United Kingdom rule out enforcement operations; France proposes escorting only once hostilities end.

**21–27 March 2026** — The Secretary-General calls for the Strait to be opened and offers United Nations assistance. Israel kills IRGC Navy commander Alireza Tangsiri. Iran announces that vessels of China, Russia, India, Iraq and Pakistan may transit, later adding Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, and accepts a United Nations request to permit humanitarian and fertilizer shipments. The IRGC declares the Strait closed to any vessel trading to or from the ports of the United States, Israel and their allies.

**7 April 2026** — The Security Council fails to adopt a Bahrain-led draft resolution on the Strait: eleven in favor, two against (China and Russia), two abstentions (Colombia and Pakistan). Bahrain's foreign minister tells the Council that the Strait is too vital to the world to be held hostage or weaponized by any one state.

**8 April 2026** — A two-week ceasefire is agreed with Pakistani mediation, with reopening of the Strait as its centerpiece. The first vessels move. Ship-tracking services count more than four hundred tankers still inside the Gulf.

**12–13 April 2026** — The Islamabad Talks fail. The United States declares a naval blockade of all traffic entering or leaving Iranian ports, while stating that it will not impede transits to and from non-Iranian ports. Commentators describe a "dual blockade": the United States sealing Iran, Iran sealing the Gulf.

**17–23 April 2026** — Iran declares the Strait "completely open" for the duration of the Lebanon ceasefire; the United States refuses to lift its blockade; Iran reimposes restrictions within a day. All six stranded cruise ships escape during the brief window. Iran seizes two container ships off Oman. The IMO reports about 20,000 mariners and 2,000 ships stranded in the Gulf.

**3–7 May 2026** — "Project Freedom": American destroyers, more than a hundred aircraft and some 15,000 personnel escort stranded vessels out of the Gulf. Three United States destroyers' transit under fire.

**5 May 2026** — Iran establishes the Persian Gulf Strait Authority to authorise transits and levy charges. Five Arab Gulf states formally reject it, warning that recognition would set a dangerous precedent. Oman does not sign the letter.

**21–27 May 2026** — The PGSA publishes coordinates defining its "management supervision area" from Mount Mubarak to southern Fujairah. The United States Treasury designates the PGSA as an IRGC extortion vehicle and warns that facilitating tolls carries sanctions exposure, naming Oman specifically. Rubio reports that China opposes both militarization and tolling.

**12–18 June 2026** — Pakistan announces agreement on a final text. On 14 June President Trump authorizes the toll-free opening of the Strait and the removal of the blockade. On 17 June the fourteen-point Islamabad Memorandum is signed. On 18 June CENTCOM lifts the blockade and Iran decrees a sixty-day no-fee window.

**19–25 June 2026** — The PGSA states that compliant transit requests will be approved during the free period. Iran and Oman agree a joint working group on the future administration of navigation in the Strait, including associated costs. The United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council jointly reject "any tolls, fees or attempts to assert control" over the Strait. Iran's First Vice President states that the Strait belongs to Iran and is a tool the country will use.

**26 June – 8 July 2026** — The cycle resumes: drone attacks on merchant vessels; American strikes on Iranian coastal radar, minelayers and more than sixty IRGC small boats; Iranian missile and drone retaliation against American facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan. Washington revokes the Iranian oil general licence on 7 July. Fourteen deaths are reported in Iran from two days of strikes.

**11 July 2026** — The IRGC fires on a Cyprus-flagged container ship using an unapproved route, leaving one crew member missing, and declares the Strait closed. CENTCOM strikes about 140 targets in its third round of the week. Diplomacy continues in Muscat and Tehran; France and Britain study an Omani proposal for navigational fees under IMO auspices.

**13–19 July 2026** — Six consecutive nights of American strikes, including on a tanker near Iran's main export terminal. Transits by ships with no Iranian nexus fall from 108 to 25 in a week; total traffic is down roughly 90 per cent year on year; close to seventy per cent of transits go dark. Brent trades near $90. The southern Omani corridor remains open and lightly used, and the Joint Maritime Information Center reminds mariners that it is available to all traffic.

## Country Specific Information

### *Gulf and Littoral States*

**Iran:** Iran controls the northern shore of the Strait and the islands — Qeshm, Hormuz, Larak, Abu Musa and the Tunbs — from which it observes and interdicts traffic. Its position is that the Strait falls under Iranian sovereignty and that vessels linked to the "aggressor parties" forfeit any right of passage, while others may transit in coordination with Iranian forces along Iranian-designated routes. Tehran maintains that it never legally closed the Strait, arguing that traffic stopped because of American and Israeli attacks and the insurance market's reaction to them. Having created the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, Iran now seeks recognition of a permanent administrative and revenue-collecting role — its single most valuable remaining source of leverage. It has not ratified UNCLOS and disputes that the transit passage regime binds it.

**Oman:** Oman holds the southern side of the chokepoint at the Musandam Peninsula, through whose territorial waters the main lanes run, and its deep-water ports at Duqm, Salalah and Sohar lie outside the Strait entirely. It is the region's habitual mediator and has hosted successive rounds of talks. Muscat declined to join the other Gulf states' formal rejection of the PGSA and has instead floated a proposal under which navigational service fees might be charged with International Maritime Organization oversight — a formula Washington reads as legitimizing Iranian tolls and has publicly warned Oman against. Its June joint statement with Iran affirmed both safe passage and each state's sovereign rights over its own waters. Oman's interest is an arrangement that does not force it to choose sides.

**United Arab Emirates:** The UAE is the only Gulf producer with meaningful bypass capacity: the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline carries roughly 1.5 million barrels per day to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. That advantage proved partial — Fujairah itself came under attack, Emirati vessels were struck and a UAE tugboat was sunk. Abu Dhabi cut production, joined statements rejecting tolls, and in April signaled that it would support an American operation to secure the Strait. The UAE also has a long-standing territorial dispute with Iran over Abu Musa and the Tunb's, which sit directly astride the approaches. It must balance close security alignment with Washington against very large commercial exposure to Iranian trade through Dubai.

**Saudi Arabia:** Saudi Arabia is the largest exporter through the Strait and the swing producer whose spare capacity normally stabilizes the market. The East–West pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea offers partial escape, and Riyadh rerouted crude there—including a cargo arranged for Pakistan—though Yanbu exposes shipments to the Houthi threat instead. Output was cut by roughly 20 per cent in March after two offshore fields were shut down. Its diplomacy has been notably restrained: it welcomed giving diplomacy a chance, urged Iran to seize the opening, and has framed the objective as restoring the position as it stood before 28 February 2026. Saudi Arabia has no appetite for hosting strikes on Iran, nor for a permanent Iranian administrative role in the Strait.

**Qatar:** No state is more exposed. Qatari LNG has almost no route to market except through Hormuz. Qatar Energy halted production on 2 March and declared force majeure on 4 March, driving European gas prices up by as much as 45 per cent within days and disrupting roughly a third of global helium supply as a by-product. Doha's energy minister warned that continued war would force other Gulf producers to declare force majeure and would "bring down economies of the world." Qatar hosts American forces and has been struck by Iranian missiles even while mediating between Washington and Tehran — a role it has sustained throughout, co-hosting the Lake Lucerne process with Pakistan.

**Bahrain:** Bahrain hosts the United States Fifth Fleet and the Joint Maritime Information Center, making it both the coordination hub for allied naval activity and a repeated target of Iranian retaliation. A port worker was killed and two wounded in the March strike on a US-flagged tanker in Bahraini waters. Bahrain drafted the Security Council resolution vetoed on 7 April, arguing that because the Gulf states are the primary source of global energy supply the security of the Strait is a shared international responsibility. Its aluminum smelter, among the world's largest, cut output as energy and feedstock tightened. Bahrain's exposure is total and its policy correspondingly firm.

**Kuwait:** Kuwait exports almost entirely through the Strait and has no bypass. Kuwait Petroleum Corporation declared force majeure on 7 March and cut production. Kuwaiti vessels were struck repeatedly, including the gas tanker Gas Al Ahmadiah off Fujairah and the VLCC Al Salmi at anchor off Dubai, while a tanker hit near Mubarak Al Kabeer Port — some 800 kilometers from the Strait — caused an oil spill and demonstrated that the whole Gulf, not merely the chokepoint, was now the battlefield. Kuwait has suffered casualties from Iranian strikes on American bases on its soil. It co-sponsored the Bahraini draft and rejects tolls, while retaining the cautious, non-confrontational posture that has defined its policy since 1991.

**Iraq:** Iraq's southern terminals at Basra depend entirely on the Strait, and the Iraqi state depends almost entirely on those exports. Production at the three main southern fields fell roughly 70 per cent — from 4.3 to 1.3 million barrels per day — within a week, and Baghdad declared force majeure on all fields operated by foreign companies on 17 March. Two tankers were attacked off Basra. The only alternative is the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline to the Mediterranean, whose capacity and political reliability are limited. Iraq is uniquely constrained: closely bound to Iran politically and economically, host to Iran-aligned armed groups, and yet ruined by the closure. It negotiated directly with Tehran for transit permissions and was named among the states whose vessels Iran would allow through.

**Israel:** Israel is not a littoral state and does not depend on the Strait, but it is central to the conflict that closed it. It conducted the 28 February strikes jointly with the United States, killed the IRGC Navy commander in March, and has continued operations in Lebanon that Iran cites as violations of successive ceasefires. Israeli policy explicitly links the waterway to the nuclear file: the Prime Minister has stated that removing enriched material, cancelling enrichment capability and "the opening of the straits" are identical objectives for Israel and the United States. Israel was not a party to the Islamabad Memorandum and has reserved freedom of action, which is itself a standing risk to any maritime settlement.

**Yemen:** Yemen has no Hormuz coastline but commands the other pole of the crisis geography at Bab el-Mandeb, giving Houthi forces a second lever over the same shipping lanes now rerouting around the Cape. Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping predate the Hormuz closure and have continued alongside it, effectively closing both ends of the Gulf-to-Mediterranean corridor simultaneously. The internationally recognized government has aligned with the Gulf coalition rhetorically but controls neither coastline in practice. Any Hormuz settlement that ignores Bab el-Mandeb risks solving half the problem.

**Lebanon:** Lebanon is not a party to the maritime dispute but is repeatedly cited by Iran as a linked theater, given continued Israeli operations against Hezbollah that Beirut says violate ceasefire terms predating the crisis. A collapsing economy and currency leave Lebanon acutely exposed to any further regional escalation or fuel-price shock. Beirut's practical position is to avoid becoming a second front while having essentially no capacity to prevent it.

**Syria:** Syria's post-transition government has limited capacity to project a position but has quietly permitted Iranian overflight and logistics in the past and remains wary of a settlement that further isolates Tehran on its border. Damascus has no fleet, no meaningful Gulf trade, and no seat at the mediating tables, leaving it a spectator with security concerns rather than an economic stake.

***Major Global Powers***

**United States:** The United States frames Hormuz as an international waterway that no state may license, toll or close, and treats the principle as precedent-setting for every other chokepoint. Its response has run through escort proposals, war-risk guarantees under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, Project Freedom, a naval blockade of Iranian ports, sustained strikes on Iranian naval and coastal capability, Treasury designations against the PGSA, and finally the Islamabad Memorandum. It has also urged allies to contribute warships and, at moments, told affected states to go and secure the Strait themselves. Washington's central difficulty is that overwhelming military superiority can suppress Iranian capability but has not yet restored sustained commercial traffic, because insurers price risk rather than declarations.

China: China is the largest beneficiary of Gulf oil, drawing roughly a third of its crude through the Strait, and the largest buyer of Iranian crude. Its position has been deliberately uncomfortable: it opposed the war, criticized Iranian attacks on neighboring states, insists the Strait should remain open to normal navigation, told Washington it favors neither militarization nor a tolling system and vetoed the Bahraini resolution as failing to capture the root causes of the conflict. Chinese-linked vessels were among the first permitted to transit, and Lloyd's List reported that Iranian charges were being assessed in yuan. Beijing holds roughly a billion barrels in reserve, has counter-sanctions legislation in force, and moved assertively at Scarborough Shoal while Washington was occupied a linkage delegates should not overlook.

**Russia:** Russia is an energy exporter that benefits commercially from a Hormuz disruption and a political partner of Iran. It vetoed the Bahraini draft on the ground that it presented Iranian conduct as the sole source of regional tension while making no mention of American and Israeli strikes. Moscow's stated position emphasizes sovereignty, non-intervention and Security Council primacy over coalitions of the willing. It has a clear interest in the precedent that Western navies cannot organize enforcement without Council authorization, and in demonstrating that sanctions regimes bend under pressure—the United States itself briefly suspended parts of its Russian oil embargo in March to ease the shortage.

**United Kingdom:** The United Kingdom has historic Gulf commitments, a naval support facility in Bahrain, and operates UKMTO, which has become the crisis's principal source of incident reporting. London has been diplomatically active—co-convening a fifty-state conference with France in April, rejecting Iranian tolls outright, discussing military options with Washington—while ruling out participation in enforcement operations. British ministers have publicly acknowledged frustration at the absence of a workable plan, and the Treasury has warned that wholesale gas price increases feed directly into household bills. The UK is examining the Omani service-fee proposal alongside France, which places it a step away from the American position.

**France:** France maintains a naval base in the United Arab Emirates and has argued throughout for a multilateral, defensive and legally grounded response. President Macron announced an escort framework under Operation Aspides, deployed frigates, circulated an alternative Security Council draft that avoided naming Iran, and co-convened the April conference with the United Kingdom. Paris insists that escorting can only follow the end of hostilities and, ideally, Iranian acquiescence—a position that irritates Washington but reflects a judgement that convoying through a mined strait without a political settlement invites escalation. A French-operated container ship, the CMA CGM Everglade, was damaged in April.

**India:** India imports the large majority of its crude, much of it from the Gulf, and around nine million Indian nationals live and work in Gulf states. Indian seafarers crew a substantial share of the world merchant fleet and were among the first killed in the crisis. New Delhi deployed frontline warships under Operation Sankalp and Operation Urja Suraksha to escort Indian-flagged shipping in the Gulf of Oman, though not into the Strait itself, and negotiated transit permissions with Tehran, which named India among the states whose vessels could pass. India's posture is protective rather than coercive: energy security, the safety of its diaspora and its crews, and de-escalation, without joining any enforcement coalition.

**Japan:** Japan obtains about 95 per cent of its crude from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, and roughly 70 per cent of that arrives through Hormuz. Refiners requested releases from national

stockpiles within days of the closure. Tokyo joined the statement of states ready to help reopen the Strait but ruled out sending Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels to escort tankers, consistent with constitutional constraints and its established practice of information-
dilemma is acute: few countries have more to lose from closure, and few have fewer instruments with which to prevent it.

***Asian Economies***

**Pakistan:** Pakistan has played a role far larger than its economic weight, mediating the April ceasefire, hosting the Islamabad Talks and lending its name to the June Memorandum, as well as facilitating the return of Iranian crew seized by American forces. Economically it is fragile and import-dependent: it asked Saudi Arabia to reroute crude through Yanbu and obtained Iranian permission for a tanker to transit in March. Pakistan abstained on the Bahraini resolution and has deployed destroyers for escort duty in the Gulf of Oman. Its interest lies in a settlement that neither humiliates Iran, with whom it shares a long border, nor alienates the Gulf states on whose remittances and financing it depends.

**Indonesia:** Indonesia is a large net oil importer with a rising LPG import requirement and a substantial seafaring workforce; three Indonesian crew were lost when a UAE tugboat was sunk in the Strait. Jakarta's tradition of non-alignment and its standing in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation shape a clear preference for negotiated de-escalation, protection of seafarers, and freedom of navigation asserted through law rather than fleets. It is also a credible bridge to Muslim-majority states uneasy about Western enforcement operations in the Gulf.

**Singapore:** Singapore is the world's largest bunkering port and a central node in tanker chartering, marine insurance and refining. Its stake is systemic rather than territorial: a chokepoint precedent established at Hormuz threatens Malacca, and Singapore's entire economic model rests on the predictability of shipping law. It has consistently defended UNCLOS and freedom of navigation, and would be expected to press for IMO-led technical solutions corridor management, convoy scheduling, mine-clearance coordination, casualty response in preference to great-power enforcement.

***Middle East and Regional Players***

**Turkey:** Turkey is a NATO member with an independent Iran policy, a significant importer of Gulf energy, and the operator of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, whose value rises whenever Hormuz is disrupted. A Turkish-operated gas carrier was among the first vessels permitted through after broadcasting its ownership, and Ankara secured Iranian approval for further transits. Turkey hosted no strikes and joined no enforcement coalition, but participated in the Pakistani-convened meeting with Egypt and Saudi Arabia on reopening the Strait. Its instinct is to position itself simultaneously as an indispensable intermediary and as an alternative transit route — roles that are commercially complementary and diplomatically delicate.

**Egypt:** Egypt has no Gulf coastline but is severely affected. Suez Canal revenues, already depressed by Houthi attacks, fell further when carriers rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, and Egyptian LNG imports and fertilizer inputs are tied to Gulf supply. Cairo joined Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey in discussions
on reopening the Strait. Its argument is that the world's chokepoints are interdependent — that Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and Suez form a single system and that Egyptian fiscal stability is collateral damage in a conflict Egypt did not join and cannot influence militarily.

Jordan: Jordan hosts American forces and has been struck repeatedly in Iranian retaliation, including at Prince Hassan Air Base in July. It imports essentially all of its energy, has minimal fiscal room to absorb price shocks, and co-sponsored the Bahraini draft resolution. Amman's position is that of a small state with no leverage over the belligerents and no means of insulating itself from them: it seeks de-escalation, guaranteed humanitarian corridors, and international support for states absorbing the economic consequences of a crisis they did not create.

**Germany -** Germany's exposure is industrial and financial rather than naval. European gas prices roughly doubled within days of the Qatari force majeure, and German industry, still adjusting after the loss of Russian pipeline gas, is acutely sensitive to LNG disruption. Berlin worked with Britain and Italy to support commercial shipping and joined the statement of states ready to help reopen the Strait, while explicitly ruling

out military involvement. As one of the E3, Germany retains a role in the nuclear diplomacy that underlies the crisis and favors embedding any Hormuz arrangement within a broader negotiated framework rather than treating it as a discrete maritime problem.

**Italy:** Italy imports a large share of its energy and sits at the Mediterranean end of the Gulf_Suez trade corridor, leaving it doubly exposed to the simultaneous disruption of Hormuz and the Red Sea. Rome worked with Britain and Germany on supporting commercial shipping and was named by France as interested in a future escort mission, while ruling out any role in enforcement. Italian energy and shipping firms feel the rerouting of Asia_Europe trade around the Cape directly, and the ports of Trieste, Genoa and Gioia Tauro lose transshipment volumes to northern European and Atlantic competitors whenever the Suez route is bypassed.

***North Powers***

**Greece:** Greek-owned vessels constitute the largest national merchant fleet in the world by tonnage, and a disproportionate share of the tankers struck, delayed or diverted since March have been Greek-flagged or Greek-owned. Athens has pressed the EU and IMO for a unified war-risk insurance mechanism rather than relying on national schemes, since Greek shipowners carry exposure far beyond Greek territorial interest. Greece has firmly opposed any tolling arrangement that would be paid vessel-by-vessel, fearing it becomes a permanent cost embedded in the world's largest shipping registry.

**Marshall Islands:** The Marshall Islands operates the world's second-largest ship registry, meaning a large share of the tankers transiting or refusing to transit Hormuz fly its flag despite having no operational or crew connection to the country. Majuro's interest is narrowly legal: preserving the registry's reputation for safety compliance and avoiding any precedent where flag states are held liable for cargo-owner or charterer decisions made in London, Athens or Singapore.

**Panama:** Panama holds the largest ship registry by number of vessels and separately operates the Panama Canal, giving it a double interest — as a flag state exposed through Hormuz-transiting tonnage, and as a canal operator watching whether Cape-routed traffic diverted from Suez creates any secondary demand for trans-isthmus shipment of Gulf cargo. Panama has stayed rhetorically neutral, favoring IMO-centered solutions that don't single out flag states for costs incurred by others.

**Norway:** Norway is a major non-OPEC oil and gas exporter that benefits commercially from elevated prices, much as Russia does, while remaining a NATO member and close partner of Gulf-aligned Western states. Oslo has increased output to help offset the Qatari LNG shortfall reaching Europe, positioning itself as a stabilizing supplier rather than a beneficiary profiting from crisis, and has contributed to European naval coordination in the Gulf of Oman without joining any Hormuz enforcement role.

**Switzerland:** Switzerland hosts a large share of the world's commodity trading houses and significant reinsurance capacity, meaning Geneva-based traders and Zurich-based reinsurers are pricing and absorbing Hormuz risk even though the state itself imports negligible Gulf oil directly. Bern's traditional neutrality gives it a potential good-offices role, and Swiss diplomats have quietly facilitated indirect US-Iran contacts in the past, though it has taken no public position on tolls or enforcement.

***Africa***

**Nigeria:** Nigeria is a major non-Gulf oil exporter with no Hormuz dependency for its own exports, giving it a mixed interest: higher global prices benefit government oil revenue, but Nigeria also imports refined products whose costs have risen with the broader shock. Abuja has called for OPEC+ coordination to stabilize markets and has been a vocal advocate, alongside other African exporters, against any precedent of unilateral tolling that could later be applied to the Bab el-Mandeb or Gulf of Guinea chokepoints closer to home.

**South Africa:** South Africa is an unexpected commercial beneficiary of the crisis: Cape-routed traffic diverted from both Suez and, secondarily, vessels seeking alternatives to Hormuz-linked insurance zones has increased bunkering, ship-repair and transshipment activity at Durban and Cape Town. Pretoria has avoided taking a substantive position on the underlying dispute, consistent with its Non-Aligned Movement orientation, while quietly welcoming the shipping revenue.

***Americas***

**Canada:** Canada has no direct Hormuz dependency, as its oil trade is overwhelmingly continental, but has joined G7 statements condemning attacks on commercial shipping and supports the general principle of freedom of navigation. Ottawa's exposure is indirect, through global price effects and NATO-ally solidarity with the United States and United Kingdom, and it has offered no naval contribution to Gulf operations.

**Brazil:** Brazil is a large and growing oil exporter with essentially no Hormuz transit exposure, and like Nigeria stands to benefit from elevated global prices even as it imports some refined products and fertilizer inputs affected by the wider disruption. Brasília has used its position to argue, consistent with its broader multipolar diplomacy, that Security Council gridlock over the Bahraini and Russian-Chinese draft resolutions demonstrates the need for reformed, more representative Council membership.

**Venezuela:** Venezuela, under continuing US sanctions, is a natural rhetorical ally of Iran's position on sovereign control of strategic waterways and has offered vocal diplomatic support for Tehran's toll and administrative claims, though it has no material capacity to affect the crisis. Caracas's interest is largely symbolic: validating the principle that a sanctioned oil state can assert extraordinary control over its own strategic geography.

**Mexico:** Mexico has minimal direct exposure to Hormuz but has felt secondary effects through global refined-product and fertilizer price increases. Mexico City has taken no substantive position beyond general statements supporting de-escalation and protection of civilian shipping and seafarers, consistent with its traditional non-interventionist foreign policy line.

***South and Southeast Asia***

**Malaysia:** Malaysia sits astride the Strait of Malacca, the chokepoint through which most Hormuz-origin crude ultimately passes en route to East Asia, giving Kuala Lumpur a direct interest in ensuring that any Hormuz precedent — particularly around tolling or unilateral administrative claims — does not migrate to its own waterway. Malaysia has been among the more vocal Southeast Asian states in defending strict UNCLOS transit-passage rules for exactly this reason.

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***Central Asia***

**Kazakhstan:** Kazakhstan is a major oil exporter whose crude mostly moves via Russian and Caspian routes rather than Hormuz, but the crisis has intensified interest in expanding the Caspian and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan corridors as alternative eastbound and westbound routes, a trend Kazakhstan has quietly encouraged as it seeks to diversify export dependency away from Russian-controlled pipelines.

**Azerbaijan:** Azerbaijan, as operator of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, has seen renewed international interest in Caspian-to-Mediterranean routing as a partial Hormuz bypass for Central Asian and even some rerouted volumes, positioning Baku as a minor beneficiary and a quiet advocate for pipeline diversification funding from Western partners eager to reduce chokepoint dependency generally.

Every delegation in this committee frames its position in the language of law—freedom of navigation, sovereignty, self-defense, non-intervention—and in almost every case the legal position adopted happens to serve a material interest. Delegates should be able to state their own country's legal argument precisely, and to explain why the opposing argument is not merely cynical. The resolution that succeeds will be the one that offers Iran something it can present as recognition, offers shipping something underwriters will accept as safety, and offers the Council ***something*** it can plausibly call law.

Country Matrix :

1. Islamic Republic of Iran
2. Sultanate of Oman
3. United Arab Emirates
4. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
5. State of Qatar
6. Kingdom of Bahrain
7. State of Kuwait
8. Republic of Iraq
9. State of Israel
10. United States of America
11. People's Republic of China
12. Russian Federation
13. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
14. French Republic
15. Republic of India
16. Japan
17. Republic of Singapore
18. Malaysia
19. Islamic Republic of Pakistan
20. Republic of Indonesia
21. Republic of Türkiye
22. Arab Republic of Egypt
23. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
24. Republic of Yemen
25. Lebanese Republic
26. Syrian Arab Republic
27. Federal Republic of Germany
28. Italian Republic
29. Kingdom of Norway
30. Swiss Confederation
31. Hellenic Republic
32. Republic of the Marshall Islands
33. Republic of Panama
34. Federal Republic of Nigeria
35. Republic of South Africa
36. Canada
37. Federative Republic of Brazil
38. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
39. United Mexican States
40. Republic of Kazakhstan

**Preambulatory and Operative Clauses**

**Preambulatory Clauses**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Affirming | Deeply conscious | Fully believing |
| Alarmed by | Deeply convinced | Further deploring |
| Approving | Deeply disturbed | Further recalling |
| Aware of | Deeply regretting | Guided by |
| Believing | Deploring | Having adopted |
| Bearing in mind | Desiring | Having considered |
| Cognizant of | Emphasizing | Having considered further |
| Confident | Expecting | Having devoted attention |
| Contemplating | Expressing its appreciation | Having examined |
| Convinced | Expressing its satisfaction Fulfilling | Having heard |
| Declaring | Fully aware | Having received |
| Deeply concerned | | Having studied |

**Operative Clauses**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Accepts | Declares accordingly | Further proclaims | Regrets |
| Affirms | Demands* | Further remind | Requests |
| Approves | Deplores | Further recommends | Resolves |
| Authorizes | Draws attention | Further requests | Solemnly affirms |
| Calls for | Designates | Further resolves | Strongly condemns |
| Calls upon | Emphasizes | Has resolved | Supports |
| Condemns | Encourages | Notes | Takes note of |
| Congratulates | Endorses | Proclaims | Trusts |
| Confirms | Expresses its appreciation | Reaffirms | Urges |
| Considers | Expresses its hope | Recommends | |
| Decides | Further invites | Reminds | |

**Moderated Caucus Topics**

1. Transit Passage versus Coastal State Sovereignty: What Does UNCLOS Actually Require in the Strait of Hormuz?
2. Tolls, Fees and Services: Can Any Charge on Transit Through an International Strait Be Lawful?
3. Naval Escorts and Coalitions of the Willing: Protection of Commerce or Provocation to Escalation?
4. The Security Council Deadlock: Veto Use, Watered-Down Drafts and the Limits of Chapter VII
5. Insurance, Shipping Lines and Classification Societies: The Private Sector as a Security Actor
6. Energy Security Beyond Oil: Fertilizer, Food Prices and the Costs Borne by the Global South
7. Mine Clearance, Deconfliction Mechanisms and the Protection of Seafarers and Stranded Crews
8. Designing a Durable Hormuz Regime: IMO Oversight, a Regional Authority, or Great-Power Guarantee?

**Points a Resolution Must Answer**

1. Reaffirm the applicable legal regime. State clearly whether the Strait of Hormuz is a strait used for international navigation subject to transit passage under Part III of UNCLOS, and address the position of bordering and user states that have not ratified the Convention.
2. Address charges directly. Draw a defensible line, if one exists, between an unlawful toll on transit and a lawful charge for specific services actually rendered—pilotage, traffic management, mine clearance, environmental response—and specify who may levy, audit and receive any such charge.
3. Determine the status of the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, and whether any single national body may license, route or condition transit through an international strait.
4. Demand the cessation of attacks on merchant vessels, and require disclosure of the number and location of sea mines together with cooperation in their removal.
5. Define permissible protective measures—escorting, convoying, deconfliction lines, enhanced security areas, notification regimes—and the legal basis on which each rests, whether Article 51, Council authorization or coastal state consent.
6. Address the legality and humanitarian consequences of naval blockade and interdiction, including the treatment of detained crews, cargoes and vessels.
7. Establish protections for seafarers: evacuation of stranded crews, hazard pay and the right of refusal, repatriation, and accountability for deaths at sea.
8. Create a verification and reporting mechanism—building on UKMTO, the Joint Maritime Information Center and the IMO—that all parties can accept as impartial, and address the problem posed by dark transits and AIS spoofing.
9. Address the humanitarian and food-security dimension, including guaranteed corridors for fertiliser, foodstuffs, medical supplies and desalination inputs, and recognise that fertiliser has no equivalent of the strategic petroleum reserve.
10. Provide for environmental protection and liability, given the spills already caused, the prevalence of uninsured shadow-fleet tonnage, and the ecological fragility of a shallow, semi-enclosed sea on which Gulf desalination depends.
11. Set out a de-escalation pathway that connects maritime arrangements to the wider negotiation, without making the safety of civilian shipping hostage to the nuclear file.
12. Specify review, sunset and dispute-settlement provisions, including recourse to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or the International Court of Justice, and a timetable for reassessment.